Of the various anti-hacker activities of 1990, "Operation Sundevil" had by far
the highest public profile. The sweeping, nationwide computer seizures of May
8, 1990 were unprecedented in scope and highly, if rather selectively, publicized.
Unlike the efforts of the Chicago Computer Fraud and Abuse Task
Force, "Operation Sundevil" was not intended to combat "hacking" in the sense
of computer intrusion or sophisticated raids on telco switching stations. Nor did
it have anything to do with hacker misdeeds with AT&T's software, or with
Southern Bell's proprietary documents.
Instead, "Operation Sundevil" was a crackdown on those traditional
scourges of the digital underground: credit-card theft and telephone code abuse.
The ambitious activities out of Chicago, and the somewhat lesser-known but
vigorous antihacker actions of the New York State Police in 1990, were never a
part of "Operation Sundevil" per se, which was based in Arizona.
Nevertheless, after the spectacular May 8 raids, the public, misled by
police secrecy, hacker panic, and a puzzled national press-corps, conflated all
aspects of the nationwide crackdown in 1990 under the blanket term "Operation
Sundevil." "Sundevil" is still the best-known synonym for the crackdown of
1990. But the Arizona organizers of "Sundevil" did not really deserve this
reputation -- any more, for instance, than all hackers deserve a reputation as
"hackers."
There was some justice in this confused perception, though. For one
thing, the confusion was abetted by the Washington office of the Secret Service,
who responded to Freedom of Information Act requests on "Operation Sundevil"
by referring investigators to the publicly known cases of Knight Lightning and
the Atlanta Three. And "Sundevil" was certainly the largest aspect of the
Crackdown, the most deliberate and the best-organized. As a crackdown on
electronic fraud, "Sundevil" lacked the frantic pace of the war on the Legion of
Doom; on the contrary, Sundevil's targets were picked out with cool deliberation
over an elaborate investigation lasting two full years.
And once again the targets were bulletin board systems.
Boards can be powerful aids to organized fraud. Underground boards
carry lively, extensive, detailed, and often quite flagrant "discussions" of
lawbreaking techniques and lawbreaking activities. "Discussing" crime in the
abstract, or "discussing" the particulars of criminal cases, is not illegal -- but
there are stern state and federal laws against coldbloodedly conspiring in groups
in order to commit crimes.
In the eyes of police, people who actively conspire to break the law are
not regarded as "clubs," "debating salons," "users' groups," or "free speech
advocates." Rather, such people tend to find themselves formally indicted by
prosecutors as "gangs," "racketeers," "corrupt organizations" and "organized
crime figures."
What's more, the illicit data contained on outlaw boards goes well
beyond mere acts of speech and/or possible criminal conspiracy. As we have
seen, it was common practice in the digital underground to post purloined
telephone codes on boards, for any phreak or hacker who cared to abuse them.
Is posting digital booty of this sort supposed to be protected by the First
Amendment? Hardly -though the issue, like most issues in cyberspace, is not
entirely resolved. Some theorists argue that to merely recite a number
publicly is not illegal - only its use is illegal. But anti-hacker police point out
that magazines and newspapers (more traditional forms of free expression) never
publish stolen telephone codes (even though this might well raise their
circulation).
Stolen credit card numbers, being riskier and more valuable, were less
often publicly posted on boards -- but there is no question that some
underground boards carried "carding" traffic, generally exchanged through
private mail.
Underground boards also carried handy programs for "scanning"
telephone codes and raiding credit card companies, as well as the usual
obnoxious galaxy of pirated software, cracked passwords, blue-box schematics,
intrusion manuals, anarchy files, porn files, and so forth.
But besides their nuisance potential for the spread of illicit knowledge,
bulletin boards have another vitally interesting aspect for the professional
investigator. Bulletin boards are cram-full of evidence. All that busy trading
of electronic mail, all those hacker boasts, brags and struts, even the stolen
codes and cards, can be neat, electronic, realtime recordings of criminal activity.
As an investigator, when you seize a pirate board, you have scored a coup as
effective as tapping phones or intercepting mail. However, you have not
actually tapped a phone or intercepted a letter. The rules of evidence regarding
phone-taps and mail interceptions are old, stern and wellunderstood by police,
prosecutors and defense attorneys alike. The rules of evidence regarding boards
are new, waffling, and understood by nobody at all.
Sundevil was the largest crackdown on boards in world history. On May
7, 8, and 9, 1990, about fortytwo computer systems were seized. Of those forty-
two computers, about twenty-five actually were running boards. (The vagueness
of this estimate is attributable to the vagueness of (a) what a "computer system"
is, and (b) what it actually means to "run a board" with one -- or with two
computers, or with three.)
About twenty-five boards vanished into police custody in May 1990. As
we have seen, there are an estimated 30,000 boards in America today. If we
assume that one board in a hundred is up to no good with codes and cards
(which rather flatters the honesty of the board-using community), then that
would leave 2,975 outlaw boards untouched by Sundevil. Sundevil seized about
one tenth of one percent of all computer bulletin boards in America. Seen
objectively, this is something less than a comprehensive assault. In 1990,
Sundevil's organizers -- the team at the Phoenix Secret Service office, and the
Arizona Attorney General's office -had a list of at least three hundred boards
that they considered fully deserving of search and seizure warrants. The twenty-
five boards actually seized were merely among the most obvious and egregious
of this much larger list of candidates. All these boards had been examined
beforehand -- either by informants, who had passed printouts to the Secret
Service, or by Secret Service agents themselves, who not only come equipped
with modems but know how to use them.
There were a number of motives for Sundevil. First, it offered a chance
to get ahead of the curve on wire-fraud crimes. Tracking back credit-card ripoffs
to their perpetrators can be appallingly difficult. If these miscreants have any
kind of electronic sophistication, they can snarl their tracks through the phone
network into a mind-boggling, untraceable mess, while still managing to "reach
out and rob someone." Boards, however, full of brags and boasts, codes and
cards, offer evidence in the handy congealed form.
Seizures themselves -- the mere physical removal of machines -- tends to
take the pressure off. During Sundevil, a large number of code kids, warez
d00dz, and credit card thieves would be deprived of those boards -- their means
of community and conspiracy -- in one swift blow. As for the sysops themselves
(commonly among the boldest offenders) they would be directly stripped of
their computer equipment, and rendered digitally mute and blind.
And this aspect of Sundevil was carried out with great success.
Sundevil seems to have been a complete tactical surprise -- unlike the
fragmentary and continuing seizures of the war on the Legion of Doom,
Sundevil was precisely timed and utterly overwhelming. At least forty
"computers" were seized during May 7, 8 and 9, 1990, in Cincinnati, Detroit,
Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, Phoenix, Tucson, Richmond, San Diego, San
Jose, Pittsburgh and San Francisco. Some cities saw multiple raids, such as the
five separate raids in the New York City environs. Plano, Texas (essentially a
suburb of the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex, and a hub of the telecommunications
industry) saw four computer seizures. Chicago, ever in the forefront, saw its
own local Sundevil raid, briskly carried out by Secret Service agents Timothy
Foley and Barbara Golden.
Many of these raids occurred, not in the cities proper, but in associated
white-middle class suburbs -- places like Mount Lebanon, Pennsylvania and
Clark Lake, Michigan. There were a few raids on offices; most took place in
people's homes, the classic hacker basements and bedrooms.
The Sundevil raids were searches and seizures, not a group of mass
arrests. There were only four arrests during Sundevil. "Tony the Trashman," a
longtime teenage bete noire of the Arizona Racketeering unit, was arrested in
Tucson on May 9. "Dr. Ripco," sysop of an outlaw board with the misfortune to
exist in Chicago itself, was also arrested -- on illegal weapons charges. Local
units also arrested a 19-year-old female phone phreak named "Electra" in
Pennsylvania, and a male juvenile in California. Federal agents however were
not seeking arrests, but computers.
Hackers are generally not indicted (if at all) until the evidence in their
seized computers is evaluated -- a process that can take weeks, months -even
years. When hackers are arrested on the spot, it's generally an arrest for other
reasons. Drugs and/or illegal weapons show up in a good third of anti-hacker
computer seizures (though not during Sundevil). That scofflaw teenage hackers
(or their parents) should have marijuana in their homes is probably not a
shocking revelation, but the surprisingly common presence of illegal firearms in
hacker dens is a bit disquieting. A Personal Computer can be a great equalizer
for the techno-cowboy -- much like that more traditional American "Great
Equalizer," the Personal Sixgun. Maybe it's not all that surprising that some
guy obsessed with power through illicit technology would also have a few illicit
high-velocity-impact devices around. An element of the digital underground
particularly dotes on those "anarchy philes," and this element tends to shade into
the crackpot milieu of survivalists, gun-nuts, anarcho-leftists and the ultra-
libertarian right-wing.
This is not to say that hacker raids to date have uncovered any major
crack-dens or illegal arsenals; but Secret Service agents do not regard "hackers"
as "just kids." They regard hackers as unpredictable people, bright and slippery.
It doesn't help matters that the hacker himself has been "hiding behind his
keyboard" all this time. Commonly, police have no idea what he looks like.
This makes him an unknown quantity, someone best treated with proper caution.
To date, no hacker has come out shooting, though they do sometimes
brag on boards that they will do just that. Threats of this sort are taken seriously.
Secret Service hacker raids tend to be swift, comprehensive, well-manned (even
overmanned); and agents generally burst through every door in the home at
once, sometimes with drawn guns. Any potential resistance is swiftly quelled.
Hacker raids are usually raids on people's homes. It can be a very dangerous
business to raid an American home; people can panic when strangers invade
their sanctum. Statistically speaking, the most dangerous thing a policeman can
do is to enter someone's home. (The second most dangerous thing is to stop a
car in traffic.) People have guns in their homes. More cops are hurt in homes
than are ever hurt in biker bars or massage parlors.
But in any case, no one was hurt during Sundevil, or indeed during any
part of the Hacker Crackdown.
Nor were there any allegations of any physical mistreatment of a suspect.
Guns were pointed, interrogations were sharp and prolonged; but no one in 1990
claimed any act of brutality by any crackdown raider.
In addition to the forty or so computers, Sundevil reaped floppy disks in
particularly great abundance -- an estimated 23,000 of them, which naturally
included every manner of illegitimate data: pirated games, stolen codes, hot
credit card numbers, the complete text and software of entire pirate bulletin-
boards. These floppy disks, which remain in police custody today, offer a
gigantic, almost embarrassingly rich source of possible criminal indictments.
These 23,000 floppy disks also include a thus-far unknown quantity of legitimate
computer games, legitimate software, purportedly "private" mail from boards,
business records, and personal correspondence of all kinds.
Standard computer-crime search warrants lay great emphasis on seizing
written documents as well as computers -- specifically including photocopies,
computer printouts, telephone bills, address books, logs, notes, memoranda and
correspondence. In practice, this has meant that diaries, gaming magazines,
software documentation, nonfiction books on hacking and computer security,
sometimes even science fiction novels, have all vanished out the door in police
custody. A wide variety of electronic items have been known to vanish as well,
including telephones, televisions, answering machines, Sony Walkmans, desktop
printers, compact disks, and audiotapes.
No fewer than 150 members of the Secret Service were sent into the field
during Sundevil. They were commonly accompanied by squads of local and/or
state police. Most of these officers -especially the locals -- had never been on
an antihacker raid before. (This was one good reason, in fact, why so many of
them were invited along in the first place.) Also, the presence of a uniformed
police officer assures the raidees that the people entering their homes are, in fact,
police. Secret Service agents wear plain clothes. So do the telco security
experts who commonly accompany the Secret Service on raids (and who make
no particular effort to identify themselves as mere employees of telephone
companies).
A typical hacker raid goes something like this. First, police storm in
rapidly, through every entrance, with overwhelming force, in the assumption
that this tactic will keep casualties to a minimum. Second, possible suspects are
immediately removed from the vicinity of any and all computer systems, so that
they will have no chance to purge or destroy computer evidence. Suspects are
herded into a room without computers, commonly the living room, and kept
under guard -not armed guard, for the guns are swiftly holstered, but under
guard nevertheless. They are presented with the search warrant and warned that
anything they say may be held against them. Commonly they have a great deal to
say, especially if they are unsuspecting parents.
Somewhere in the house is the "hot spot" -- a computer tied to a phone
line (possibly several computers and several phones). Commonly it's a
teenager's bedroom, but it can be anywhere in the house; there may be several
such rooms. This "hot spot" is put in charge of a two-agent team, the "finder"
and the "recorder." The "finder" is computer-trained, commonly the case agent
who has actually obtained the search warrant from a judge. He or she
understands what is being sought, and actually carries out the seizures: unplugs
machines, opens drawers, desks, files, floppy-disk containers, etc. The
"recorder" photographs all the equipment, just as it stands -- especially the tangle
of wired connections in the back, which can otherwise be a real nightmare to
restore. The recorder will also commonly photograph every room in the house,
lest some wily criminal claim that the police had robbed him during the search.
Some recorders carry videocams or tape recorders; however, it's more common
for the recorder to simply take written notes. Objects are described and
numbered as the finder seizes them, generally on standard preprinted police
inventory forms.
Even Secret Service agents were not, and are not, expert computer users.
They have not made, and do not make, judgements on the fly about potential
threats posed by various forms of equipment. They may exercise discretion;
they may leave Dad his computer, for instance, but they don't have to.
Standard computer-crime search warrants, which date back to the early 80s, use
a sweeping language that targets computers, most anything attached to a
computer, most anything used to operate a computer -- most anything that
remotely resembles a computer -- plus most any and all written documents
surrounding it. Computer-crime investigators have strongly urged agents to seize
the works.
In this sense, Operation Sundevil appears to have been a complete
success. Boards went down all over America, and were shipped en masse to the
computer investigation lab of the Secret Service, in Washington DC, along with
the 23,000 floppy disks and unknown quantities of printed material.
But the seizure of twenty-five boards, and the multi-megabyte mountains
of possibly useful evidence contained in these boards (and in their owners' other
computers, also out the door), were far from the only motives for Operation
Sundevil. An unprecedented action of great ambition and size, Sundevil's
motives can only be described as political. It was a public-relations effort,
meant to pass certain messages, meant to make certain situations clear: both in
the mind of the general public, and in the minds of various constituencies of the
electronic community.
First -- and this motivation was vital -- a "message" would be sent from
law enforcement to the digital underground. This very message was recited in
so many words by Garry M. Jenkins, the Assistant Director of the US Secret
Service, at the Sundevil press conference in Phoenix on May 9, 1990,
immediately after the raids. In brief, hackers were mistaken in their foolish
belief that they could hide behind the "relative anonymity of their computer
terminals." On the contrary, they should fully understand that state and federal
cops were actively patrolling the beat in cyberspace -- that they were on the
watch everywhere, even in those sleazy and secretive dens of cybernetic vice, the
underground boards.
This is not an unusual message for police to publicly convey to crooks.
The message is a standard message; only the context is new. In this respect, the
Sundevil raids were the digital equivalent of the standard vice-squad crackdown
on massage parlors, porno bookstores, head-shops, or floating crap-games.
There may be few or no arrests in a raid of this sort; no convictions, no trials, no
interrogations. In cases of this sort, police may well walk out the door with
many pounds of sleazy magazines, X-rated videotapes, sex toys, gambling
equipment, baggies of marijuana....
Of course, if something truly horrendous is discovered by the raiders,
there will be arrests and prosecutions. Far more likely, however, there will
simply be a brief but sharp disruption of the closed and secretive world of the
nogoodniks. There will be "street hassle." "Heat." "Deterrence." And, of
course, the immediate loss of the seized goods. It is very unlikely that any of
this seized material will ever be returned. Whether charged or not, whether
convicted or not, the perpetrators will almost surely lack the nerve ever to ask
for this stuff to be given back.
Arrests and trials -- putting people in jail -- may involve all kinds of
formal legalities; but dealing with the justice system is far from the only task of
police. Police do not simply arrest people. They don't simply put people in jail.
That is not how the police perceive their jobs. Police "protect and serve." Police
"keep the peace," they "keep public order." Like other forms of public relations,
keeping public order is not an exact science. Keeping public order is something
of an art-form.
If a group of tough-looking teenage hoodlums was loitering on a street-
corner, no one would be surprised to see a street-cop arrive and sternly order
them to "break it up." On the contrary, the surprise would come if one of these
ne'er-do-wells stepped briskly into a phone-booth, called a civil rights lawyer,
and instituted a civil suit in defense of his Constitutional rights of free speech
and free assembly. But something much along this line was one of the many
anomolous outcomes of the Hacker Crackdown.
Sundevil also carried useful "messages" for other constituents of the
electronic community. These messages may not have been read aloud from the
Phoenix podium in front of the press corps, but there was little mistaking their
meaning. There was a message of reassurance for the primary victims of coding
and carding: the telcos, and the credit companies. Sundevil was greeted with
joy by the security officers of the electronic business community. After years of
high-tech harassment and spiralling revenue losses, their complaints of rampant
outlawry were being taken seriously by law enforcement. No more head-
scratching or dismissive shrugs; no more feeble excuses about "lack of
computer-trained officers" or the low priority of "victimless" white-collar
telecommunication crimes.
Computer-crime experts have long believed that computer-related
offenses are drastically under-reported. They regard this as a major open
scandal of their field. Some victims are reluctant to come forth, because they
believe that police and prosecutors are not computer-literate, and can and will do
nothing. Others are embarrassed by their vulnerabilities, and will take strong
measures to avoid any publicity; this is especially true of banks, who fear a loss
of investor confidence should an embezzlement-case or wire-fraud surface.
And some victims are so helplessly confused by their own high technology that
they never even realize that a crime has occurred -- even when they have been
fleeced to the bone.
The results of this situation can be dire. Criminals escape apprehension
and punishment. The computer-crime units that do exist, can't get work. The
true scope of computer-crime: its size, its real nature, the scope of its threats,
and the legal remedies for it -- all remain obscured. Another problem is very
little publicized, but it is a cause of genuine concern. Where there is persistent
crime, but no effective police protection, then vigilantism can result. Telcos,
banks, credit companies, the major corporations who maintain extensive
computer networks vulnerable to hacking -- these organizations are powerful,
wealthy, and politically influential. They are disinclined to be pushed around by
crooks (or by most anyone else, for that matter). They often maintain well-
organized private security forces, commonly run by experienced veterans of
military and police units, who have left public service for the greener pastures
of the private sector. For police, the corporate security manager can be a
powerful ally; but if this gentleman finds no allies in the police, and the pressure
is on from his board-of-directors, he may quietly take certain matters into his
own hands.
Nor is there any lack of disposable hired-help in the corporate security
business. Private security agencies -- the 'security business' generally -- grew
explosively in the 1980s. Today there are spooky gumshoed armies of "security
consultants," "rent-acops," "private eyes," "outside experts" -- every manner of
shady operator who retails in "results" and discretion. Or course, many of these
gentlemen and ladies may be paragons of professional and moral rectitude. But
as anyone who has read a hard-boiled detective novel knows, police tend to be
less than fond of this sort of private-sector competition.
Companies in search of computer-security have even been known to hire
hackers. Police shudder at this prospect.
Police treasure good relations with the business community. Rarely will
you see a policeman so indiscreet as to allege publicly that some major
employer in his state or city has succumbed to paranoia and gone off the rails.
Nevertheless, police -- and computer police in particular -- are aware of this
possibility. Computer-crime police can and do spend up to half of their
business hours just doing public relations: seminars, "dog and pony shows,"
sometimes with parents' groups or computer users, but generally with their core
audience: the likely victims of hacking crimes. These, of course, are telcos,
credit card companies and large computerequipped corporations. The police
strongly urge these people, as good citizens, to report offenses and press criminal
charges; they pass the message that there is someone in authority who cares,
understands, and, best of all, will take useful action should a computer-crime
occur. But reassuring talk is cheap. Sundevil offered action.
The final message of Sundevil was intended for internal consumption by
law enforcement. Sundevil was offered as proof that the community of
American computer-crime police had come of age. Sundevil was proof that
enormous things like Sundevil itself could now be accomplished. Sundevil was
proof that the Secret Service and its local law-enforcement allies could act like a
welloiled machine -- (despite the hampering use of those scrambled phones). It
was also proof that the Arizona Organized Crime and Racketeering Unit -the
sparkplug of Sundevil -- ranked with the best in the world in ambition,
organization, and sheer conceptual daring.
And, as a final fillip, Sundevil was a message from the Secret Service to
their longtime rivals in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. By Congressional
fiat, both USSS and FBI formally share jurisdiction over federal computer-
crimebusting activities. Neither of these groups has ever been remotely happy
with this muddled situation. It seems to suggest that Congress cannot make up
its mind as to which of these groups is better qualified. And there is scarcely a
G-man or a Special Agent anywhere without a very firm opinion on that topic.
1.
For the neophyte, one of the most puzzling aspects of the crackdown on
hackers is why the United States Secret Service has anything at all to do with
this matter.
The Secret Service is best known for its primary public role: its agents
protect the President of the United States. They also guard the President's
family, the Vice President and his family, former Presidents, and Presidential
candidates. They sometimes guard foreign dignitaries who are visiting the
United States, especially foreign heads of state, and have been known to
accompany American officials on diplomatic missions overseas.
Special Agents of the Secret Service don't wear uniforms, but the Secret
Service also has two uniformed police agencies. There's the former White
House Police (now known as the Secret Service Uniformed Division, since they
currently guard foreign embassies in Washington, as well as the White House
itself). And there's the uniformed Treasury Police Force.
The Secret Service has been charged by Congress with a number of little-
known duties. They guard the precious metals in Treasury vaults. They guard the
most valuable historical documents of the United States: originals of the
Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, Lincoln's Second Inaugural
Address, an American-owned copy of the Magna Carta, and so forth. Once they
were assigned to guard the Mona Lisa, on her American tour in the 1960s.
The entire Secret Service is a division of the Treasury Department.
Secret Service Special Agents (there are about 1,900 of them) are bodyguards
for the President et al, but they all work for the Treasury. And the Treasury
(through its divisions of the U.S. Mint and the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing) prints the nation's money.
As Treasury police, the Secret Service guards the nation's currency; it is
the only federal law enforcement agency with direct jurisdiction over
counterfeiting and forgery. It analyzes documents for authenticity, and its fight
against fake cash is still quite lively (especially since the skilled counterfeiters
of Medellin, Columbia have gotten into the act). Government checks, bonds,
and other obligations, which exist in untold millions and are worth untold
billions, are common targets for forgery, which the Secret Service also battles.
It even handles forgery of postage stamps. But cash is fading in importance
today as money has become electronic. As necessity beckoned, the Secret
Service moved from fighting the counterfeiting of paper currency and the
forging of checks, to the protection of funds transferred by wire.
From wire-fraud, it was a simple skip-and-jump to what is formally
known as "access device fraud." Congress granted the Secret Service the
authority to investigate "access device fraud" under Title 18 of the United States
Code (U.S.C. Section 1029).
The term "access device" seems intuitively simple. It's some kind of
high-tech gizmo you use to get money with. It makes good sense to put this sort
of thing in the charge of counterfeiting and wirefraud experts.
However, in Section 1029, the term "access device" is very generously
defined. An access device is: "any card, plate, code, account number, or other
means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another
access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or
that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds."
"Access device" can therefore be construed to include credit cards
themselves (a popular forgery item nowadays). It also includes credit card
account numbers, those standards of the digital underground. The same goes
for telephone charge cards (an increasingly popular item with telcos, who are
tired of being robbed of pocket change by phone-booth thieves). And also
telephone access codes, those other standards of the digital underground.
(Stolen telephone codes may not "obtain money," but they certainly do obtain
valuable "services," which is specifically forbidden by Section 1029.)
We can now see that Section 1029 already pits the United States Secret
Service directly against the digital underground, without any mention at all of
the word "computer."
Standard phreaking devices, like "blue boxes," used to steal phone
service from old-fashioned mechanical switches, are unquestionably
"counterfeit access devices." Thanks to Sec.1029, it is not only illegal to use
counterfeit access devices, but it is even illegal to build them. "Producing,"
"designing" "duplicating" or "assembling" blue boxes are all federal crimes
today, and if you do this, the Secret Service has been charged by Congress to
come after you.
Automatic Teller Machines, which replicated all over America during the
1980s, are definitely "access devices," too, and an attempt to tamper with their
punch-in codes and plastic bank cards falls directly under Sec. 1029.
Section 1029 is remarkably elastic. Suppose you find a computer
password in somebody's trash. That password might be a "code" -- it's certainly
a "means of account access." Now suppose you log on to a computer and copy
some software for yourself. You've certainly obtained "service" (computer
service) and a "thing of value" (the software). Suppose you tell a dozen friends
about your swiped password, and let them use it, too. Now you're "trafficking in
unauthorized access devices." And when the Prophet, a member of the Legion
of Doom, passed a stolen telephone company document to Knight Lightning at
Phrack magazine, they were both charged under Sec. 1029!
There are two limitations on Section 1029. First, the offense must
"affect interstate or foreign commerce" in order to become a matter of federal
jurisdiction. The term "affecting commerce" is not well defined; but you may
take it as a given that the Secret Service can take an interest if you've done most
anything that happens to cross a state line. State and local police can be touchy
about their jurisdictions, and can sometimes be mulish when the feds show up.
But when it comes to computercrime, the local police are pathetically grateful
for federal help -- in fact they complain that they can't get enough of it. If you're
stealing long-distance service, you're almost certainly crossing state lines, and
you're definitely "affecting the interstate commerce" of the telcos. And if you're
abusing credit cards by ordering stuff out of glossy catalogs from, say, Vermont,
you're in for it. The second limitation is money. As a rule, the feds don't pursue
penny-ante offenders. Federal judges will dismiss cases that appear to waste
their time. Federal crimes must be serious; Section 1029 specifies a minimum
loss of a thousand dollars. We now come to the very next section of Title 18,
which is Section 1030, "Fraud and related activity in connection with
computers." This statute gives the Secret Service direct jurisdiction over acts of
computer intrusion. On the face of it, the Secret Service would now seem to
command the field. Section 1030, however, is nowhere near so ductile as
Section 1029. The first annoyance is Section 1030(d), which reads:
"(d) The United States Secret Service shall, in addition to any other
agency having such authority, have the authority to investigate offenses under
this section. Such authority of the United States Secret Service shall be
exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General." (Author's italics.)
The Secretary of the Treasury is the titular head of the Secret Service,
while the Attorney General is in charge of the FBI. In Section (d), Congress
shrugged off responsibility for the computer-crime turf-battle between the
Service and the Bureau, and made them fight it out all by themselves. The result
was a rather dire one for the Secret Service, for the FBI ended up with exclusive
jurisdiction over computer break-ins having to do with national security, foreign
espionage, federally insured banks, and U.S. military bases, while retaining joint
jurisdiction over all the other computer intrusions. Essentially, when it comes to
Section 1030, the FBI not only gets the real glamor stuff for itself, but can peer
over the shoulder of the Secret Service and barge in to meddle whenever it suits
them. The second problem has to do with the dicey term "Federal interest
computer." Section 1030(a)(2) makes it illegal to "access a computer without
authorization" if that computer belongs to a financial institution or an issuer of
credit cards (fraud cases, in other words). Congress was quite willing to give
the Secret Service jurisdiction over money-transferring computers, but Congress
balked at letting them investigate any and all computer intrusions. Instead, the
USSS had to settle for the money machines and the "Federal interest computers."
A "Federal interest computer" is a computer which the government itself owns,
or is using. Large networks of interstate computers, linked over state lines, are
also considered to be of "Federal interest." (This notion of "Federal interest" is
legally rather foggy and has never been clearly defined in the courts. The Secret
Service has never yet had its hand slapped for investigating computer break-ins
that were not of "Federal interest," but conceivably someday this might
happen.)
So the Secret Service's authority over "unauthorized access" to
computers covers a lot of territory, but by no means the whole ball of
cyberspatial wax. If you are, for instance, a local computer retailer, or the
owner of a local bulletin board system, then a malicious local intruder can
break in, crash your system, trash your files and scatter viruses, and the U.S.
Secret Service cannot do a single thing about it.
At least, it can't do anything directly. But the Secret Service will do
plenty to help the local people who can.
The FBI may have dealt itself an ace off the bottom of the deck when it
comes to Section 1030; but that's not the whole story; that's not the street. What's
Congress thinks is one thing, and Congress has been known to change its mind.
The real turfstruggle is out there in the streets where it's happening. If you're
a local street-cop with a computer problem, the Secret Service wants you to
know where you can find the real expertise. While the Bureau crowd are off
having their favorite shoes polished -- (wing-tips) -- and making derisive fun of
the Service's favorite shoes -- ("pansy-ass tassels") -the tassel-toting Secret
Service has a crew of readyand-able hacker-trackers installed in the capital of
every state in the Union. Need advice? They'll give you advice, or at least point
you in the right direction. Need training? They can see to that, too.
If you're a local cop and you call in the FBI, the FBI (as is widely and
slanderously rumored) will order you around like a coolie, take all the credit for
your busts, and mop up every possible scrap of reflected glory. The Secret
Service, on the other hand, doesn't brag a lot. They're the quiet types. Very
quiet. Very cool. Efficient. High-tech. Mirrorshades, icy stares, radio ear-
plugs, an Uzi machine-pistol tucked somewhere in that well-cut jacket.
American samurai, sworn to give their lives to protect our President. "The
granite agents." Trained in martial arts, absolutely fearless. Every single one of
'em has a top-secret security clearance. Something goes a little wrong, you're not
gonna hear any whining and moaning and political buck- passing out of these
guys.
The facade of the granite agent is not, of course, the reality. Secret
Service agents are human beings. And the real glory in Service work is not in
battling computer crime -- not yet, anyway -- but in protecting the President.
The real glamour of Secret Service work is in the White House Detail. If you're
at the President's side, then the kids and the wife see you on television; you rub
shoulders with the most powerful people in the world. That's the real heart of
Service work, the number one priority. More than one computer investigation
has stopped dead in the water when Service agents vanished at the President's
need.
There's romance in the work of the Service. The intimate access to
circles of great power; the espritde-corps of a highly trained and disciplined
elite; the high responsibility of defending the Chief Executive; the fulfillment of
a patriotic duty. And as police work goes, the pay's not bad. But there's squalor
in Service work, too. You may get spat upon by protesters howling abuse -- and
if they get violent, if they get too close, sometimes you have to knock one of
them down -- discreetly.
The real squalor in Service work is drudgery such as "the quarterlies,"
traipsing out four times a year, year in, year out, to interview the various pathetic
wretches, many of them in prisons and asylums, who have seen fit to threaten the
President's life. And then there's the grinding stress of searching all those faces
in the endless bustling crowds, looking for hatred, looking for psychosis, looking
for the tight, nervous face of an Arthur Bremer, a Squeaky Fromme, a Lee
Harvey Oswald. It's watching all those grasping, waving hands for sudden
movements, while your ears strain at your radio headphone for the long-
rehearsed cry of "Gun!"
It's poring, in grinding detail, over the biographies of every rotten loser
who ever shot at a President. It's the unsung work of the Protective Research
Section, who study scrawled, anonymous death threats with all the meticulous
tools of antiforgery techniques.
And it's maintaining the hefty computerized files on anyone who ever
threatened the President's life. Civil libertarians have become increasingly
concerned at the Government's use of computer files to track American citizens -
- but the Secret Service file of potential Presidential assassins, which has
upward of twenty thousand names, rarely causes a peep of protest. If you ever
state that you intend to kill the President, the Secret Service will want to know
and record who you are, where you are, what you are, and what you're up to. If
you're a serious threat -- if you're officially considered "of protective interest" --
then the Secret Service may well keep tabs on you for the rest of your natural
life.
Protecting the President has first call on all the Service's resources. But
there's a lot more to the Service's traditions and history than standing guard
outside the Oval Office. The Secret Service is the nation's oldest general federal
law-enforcement agency. Compared to the Secret Service, the FBI are new-
hires and the CIA are temps. The Secret Service was founded 'way back in
1865, at the suggestion of Hugh McCulloch, Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of the
Treasury. McCulloch wanted a specialized Treasury police to combat
counterfeiting. Abraham Lincoln agreed that this seemed a good idea, and, with
a terrible irony, Abraham Lincoln was shot that very night by John Wilkes
Booth.
The Secret Service originally had nothing to do with protecting
Presidents. They didn't take this on as a regular assignment until after the
Garfield assassination in 1881.
And they didn't get any Congressional money for it until President
McKinley was shot in 1901. The Service was originally designed for one
purpose: destroying counterfeiters.
2.
There are interesting parallels between the
Service's nineteenth-century entry into counterfeiting, and America's twentieth-
century entry into computer-crime.
In 1865, America's paper currency was a terrible muddle. Security was
drastically bad. Currency was printed on the spot by local banks in literally
hundreds of different designs. No one really knew what the heck a dollar bill
was supposed to look like. Bogus bills passed easily. If some joker told you that
a one-dollar bill from the Railroad Bank of Lowell, Massachusetts had a woman
leaning on a shield, with a locomotive, a cornucopia, a compass, various
agricultural implements, a railroad bridge, and some factories, then you pretty
much had to take his word for it. (And in fact he was telling the truth!)
Sixteen hundred local American banks designed and printed their own
paper currency, and there were no general standards for security. Like a badly
guarded node in a computer network, badly designed bills were easy to fake, and
posed a security hazard for the entire monetary system.
No one knew the exact extent of the threat to the currency. There were
panicked estimates that as much as a third of the entire national currency was
faked. Counterfeiters -- known as "boodlers" in the underground slang of the
time -- were mostly technically skilled printers who had gone to the bad. Many
had once worked printing legitimate currency. Boodlers operated in rings and
gangs. Technical experts engraved the bogus plates -- commonly in basements
in New York City. Smooth confidence men passed large wads of high-quality,
highdenomination fakes, including the really sophisticated stuff -- government
bonds, stock certificates, and railway shares. Cheaper, botched fakes were sold
or sharewared to low-level gangs of boodler wannabes. (The really cheesy
lowlife boodlers merely upgraded real bills by altering face values, changing
ones to fives, tens to hundreds, and so on.) The techniques of boodling were
little-known and regarded with a certain awe by the midnineteenth-century
public. The ability to manipulate the system for rip-off seemed diabolically
clever. As the skill and daring of the boodlers increased, the situation became
intolerable. The federal government stepped in, and began offering its own
federal currency, which was printed in fancy green ink, but only on the back -
the original "greenbacks." And at first, the improved security of the well-
designed, well-printed federal greenbacks seemed to solve the problem; but then
the counterfeiters caught on. Within a few years things were worse than ever: a
centralized system where all security was bad!
The local police were helpless. The Government tried offering blood
money to potential informants, but this met with little success. Banks, plagued
by boodling, gave up hope of police help and hired private security men instead.
Merchants and bankers queued up by the thousands to buy privately-printed
manuals on currency security, slim little books like Laban Heath's Infallible
Government Counterfeit Detector. The back of the book offered Laban Heath's
patent microscope for five bucks. Then the Secret Service entered the picture.
The first agents were a rough and ready crew. Their chief was one William P.
Wood, a former guerilla in the Mexican War who'd won a reputation busting
contractor fraudsters for the War Department during the Civil War. Wood, who
was also Keeper of the Capital Prison, had a sideline as a counterfeiting expert,
bagging boodlers for the federal bounty money.
Wood was named Chief of the new Secret Service in July 1865. There
were only ten Secret Service agents in all: Wood himself, a handful who'd
worked for him in the War Department, and a few former private investigators --
counterfeiting experts -- whom Wood had won over to public service. (The
Secret Service of 1865 was much the size of the Chicago Computer Fraud Task
Force or the Arizona Racketeering Unit of 1990.) These ten "Operatives" had an
additional twenty or so "Assistant Operatives" and "Informants." Besides salary
and per diem, each Secret Service employee received a whopping twenty-five
dollars for each boodler he captured.
Wood himself publicly estimated that at least half of America's
currency was counterfeit, a perhaps pardonable perception. Within a year the
Secret Service had arrested over 200 counterfeiters. They busted about two
hundred boodlers a year for four years straight.
Wood attributed his success to travelling fast and light, hitting the bad-
guys hard, and avoiding bureaucratic baggage. "Because my raids were made
without military escort and I did not ask the assistance of state officers, I
surprised the professional counterfeiter."
Wood's social message to the once-impudent boodlers bore an eerie ring
of Sundevil: "It was also my purpose to convince such characters that it would
no longer be healthy for them to ply their vocation without being handled
roughly, a fact they soon discovered."
William P. Wood, the Secret Service's guerilla pioneer, did not end well.
He succumbed to the lure of aiming for the really big score. The notorious
Brockway Gang of New York City, headed by William E. Brockway, the "King
of the Counterfeiters," had forged a number of government bonds. They'd
passed these brilliant fakes on the prestigious Wall Street investment firm of Jay
Cooke and Company. The Cooke firm were frantic and offered a huge reward
for the forgers' plates.
Laboring diligently, Wood confiscated the plates (though not Mr.
Brockway) and claimed the reward. But the Cooke company treacherously
reneged. Wood got involved in a down-and-dirty lawsuit with the Cooke
capitalists. Wood's boss, Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch, felt that Wood's
demands for money and glory were unseemly, and even when the reward money
finally came through, McCulloch refused to pay Wood anything. Wood found
himself mired in a seemingly endless round of federal suits and Congressional
lobbying.
Wood never got his money. And he lost his job to boot. He resigned in
1869.
Wood's agents suffered, too. On May 12, 1869, the second Chief of the
Secret Service took over, and almost immediately fired most of Wood's pioneer
Secret Service agents: Operatives, Assistants and Informants alike. The
practice of receiving $25 per crook was abolished. And the Secret Service
began the long, uncertain process of thorough professionalization.
Wood ended badly. He must have felt stabbed in the back. In fact his
entire organization was mangled.
On the other hand, William P. Wood was the first head of the Secret
Service. William Wood was the pioneer. People still honor his name. Who
remembers the name of the second head of the Secret Service?
As for William Brockway (also known as "Colonel Spencer"), he was
finally arrested by the Secret Service in 1880. He did five years in prison, got
out, and was still boodling at the age of seventyfour.
4.
"Credit cards didn't used to cost anything to get," says Gail Thackeray.
"Now they cost forty bucks -- and that's all just to cover the costs from rip-off
artists."
Electronic nuisance criminals are parasites. One by one they're not much
harm, no big deal. But they never come just one by one. They come in swarms,
heaps, legions, sometimes whole subcultures. And they bite. Every time we buy
a credit card today, we lose a little financial vitality to a particular species of
bloodsucker. What, in her expert opinion, are the worst forms of electronic
crime, I ask, consulting my notes. Is it -credit card fraud? Breaking into ATM
bank machines? Phone-phreaking? Computer intrusions? Software viruses?
Access-code theft? Records tampering? Software piracy? Pornographic bulletin
boards? Satellite TV piracy? Theft of cable service? It's a long list. By the
time I reach the end of it I feel rather depressed. "Oh no," says Gail Thackeray,
leaning forward over the table, her whole body gone stiff with energetic
indignation, "the biggest damage is telephone fraud. Fake sweepstakes, fake
charities. Boiler-room con operations. You could pay off the national debt with
what these guys steal.... They target old people, they get hold of credit ratings
and demographics, they rip off the old and the weak." The words come tumbling
out of her.
It's low-tech stuff, your everyday boiler-room fraud. Grifters, conning
people out of money over the phone, have been around for decades. This is
where the word "phony" came from!
It's just that it's so much easier now, horribly facilitated by advances in
technology and the byzantine structure of the modern phone system. The same
professional fraudsters do it over and over, Thackeray tells me, they hide behind
dense onion-shells of fake companies.... fake holding corporations nine or ten
layers deep, registered all over the map. They get a phone installed under a false
name in an empty safe-house. And then they call-forward everything out of that
phone to yet another phone, a phone that may even be in another state. And
they don't even pay the charges on their phones; after a month or so, they just
split. Set up somewhere else in another Podunkville with the same seedy crew
of veteran phone-crooks. They buy or steal commercial credit card reports, slap
them on the PC, have a program pick out people over sixty-five who pay a lot to
charities. A whole subculture living off this, merciless folks on the con.
"The 'light-bulbs for the blind' people," Thackeray muses, with a special
loathing. "There's just no end to them."
We're sitting in a downtown diner in Phoenix, Arizona. It's a tough
town, Phoenix. A state capital seeing some hard times. Even to a Texan like
myself, Arizona state politics seem rather baroque. There was, and remains,
endless trouble over the Martin Luther King holiday, the sort of stiff-necked,
foot-shooting incident for which Arizona politics seem famous. There was Evan
Mecham, the eccentric Republican millionaire governor who was impeached,
after reducing state government to a ludicrous shambles. Then there was the
national Keating scandal, involving Arizona savings and loans, in which both of
Arizona's U.S. senators, DeConcini and McCain, played sadly prominent roles.
And the very latest is the bizarre AzScam case, in which state legislators
were videotaped, eagerly taking cash from an informant of the Phoenix city
police department, who was posing as a Vegas mobster.
"Oh," says Thackeray cheerfully. "These people are amateurs here, they
thought they were finally getting to play with the big boys. They don't have the
least idea how to take a bribe! It's not institutional corruption. It's not like back
in Philly."
Gail Thackeray was a former prosecutor in Philadelphia. Now she's a
former assistant attorney general of the State of Arizona. Since moving to
Arizona in 1986, she had worked under the aegis of Steve Twist, her boss in the
Attorney General's office. Steve Twist wrote Arizona's pioneering computer
crime laws and naturally took an interest in seeing them enforced. It was a snug
niche, and Thackeray's Organized Crime and Racketeering Unit won a national
reputation for ambition and technical knowledgeability.... Until the latest
election in Arizona. Thackeray's boss ran for the top job, and lost. The victor,
the new Attorney General, apparently went to some pains to eliminate the
bureaucratic traces of his rival, including his pet group -- Thackeray's group.
Twelve people got their walking papers.
Now Thackeray's painstakingly assembled computer lab sits gathering
dust somewhere in the glass-and-concrete Attorney General's HQ on 1275
Washington Street. Her computer-crime books, her painstakingly garnered back
issues of phreak and hacker zines, all bought at her own expense -- are piled in
boxes somewhere. The State of Arizona is simply not particularly interested in
electronic racketeering at the moment.
At the moment of our interview, Gail Thackeray, officially unemployed,
is working out of the county sheriff's office, living on her savings, and
prosecuting several cases -- working 60-hour weeks, just as always -- for no pay
at all. "I'm trying to train people," she mutters.
Half her life seems to be spent training people - merely pointing out, to
the naive and incredulous (such as myself) that this stuff is actually going on
out there. It's a small world, computer crime. A young world. Gail
Thackeray, a trim blonde BabyBoomer who favors Grand Canyon white-water
rafting to kill some slow time, is one of the world's most senior, most veteran
"hacker-trackers." Her mentor was Donn Parker, the California think-tank
theorist who got it all started 'way back in the mid70s, the "grandfather of the
field," "the great bald eagle of computer crime."
And what she has learned, Gail Thackeray teaches. Endlessly. Tirelessly.
To anybody. To Secret Service agents and state police, at the Glynco, Georgia
federal training center. To local police, on "roadshows" with her slide projector
and notebook. To corporate security personnel. To journalists. To parents.
Even crooks look to Gail Thackeray for advice. Phone-phreaks call her
at the office. They know very well who she is. They pump her for information
on what the cops are up to, how much they know. Sometimes whole crowds
of phone phreaks, hanging out on illegal conference calls, will call Gail
Thackeray up. They taunt her. And, as always, they boast. Phone-phreaks, real
stone phone-phreaks, simply cannot shut up. They natter on for hours.
Left to themselves, they mostly talk about the intricacies of ripping-off
phones; it's about as interesting as listening to hot-rodders talk about suspension
and distributor-caps. They also gossip cruelly about each other. And when
talking to Gail Thackeray, they incriminate themselves. "I have tapes,"
Thackeray says coolly.
Phone phreaks just talk like crazy. "Dial-Tone" out in Alabama has been
known to spend half-an- hour simply reading stolen phone-codes aloud into
voice-mail answering machines. Hundreds, thousands of numbers, recited in a
monotone, without a break -- an eerie phenomenon. When arrested, it's a rare
phone phreak who doesn't inform at endless length on everybody he knows.
Hackers are no better. What other group of criminals, she asks
rhetorically, publishes newsletters and holds conventions? She seems deeply
nettled by the sheer brazenness of this behavior, though to an outsider, this
activity might make one wonder whether hackers should be considered
"criminals" at all. Skateboarders have magazines, and they trespass a lot. Hot
rod people have magazines and they break speed limits and sometimes kill
people....
I ask her whether it would be any loss to society if phone phreaking and
computer hacking, as hobbies, simply dried up and blew away, so that nobody
ever did it again. She seems surprised. "No," she says swiftly. "Maybe a little...
in the old days... the MIT stuff... But there's a lot of wonderful, legal stuff you
can do with computers now, you don't have to break into somebody else's just to
learn. You don't have that excuse. You can learn all you like." Did you ever
hack into a system? I ask.
The trainees do it at Glynco. Just to demonstrate system vulnerabilities.
She's cool to the notion. Genuinely indifferent. "What kind of computer do you
have?"
"A Compaq 286LE," she mutters.
"What kind do you wish you had?"
At this question, the unmistakable light of true hackerdom flares in Gail
Thackeray's eyes. She becomes tense, animated, the words pour out: "An
Amiga 2000 with an IBM card and Mac emulation! The most common hacker
machines are Amigas and Commodores. And Apples." If she had the Amiga,
she enthuses, she could run a whole galaxy of seized computer-evidence disks
on one convenient multifunctional machine. A cheap one, too. Not like the old
Attorney General lab, where they had an ancient CP/M machine, assorted Amiga
flavors and Apple flavors, a couple IBMS, all the utility software... but no
Commodores. The workstations down at the Attorney General's are Wang
dedicated word-processors. Lame machines tied in to an office net -- though at
least they get online to the Lexis and Westlaw legal data services. I don't say
anything. I recognize the syndrome, though. This computer-fever has been
running through segments of our society for years now. It's a strange kind of
lust: K-hunger, Meg-hunger; but it's a shared disease; it can kill parties dead, as
conversation spirals into the deepest and most deviant recesses of software
releases and expensive peripherals.... The mark of the hacker beast. I have it
too. The whole "electronic community," whatever the hell that is, has it. Gail
Thackeray has it. Gail Thackeray is a hacker cop. My immediate reaction is a
strong rush of indignant pity: why doesn't somebody buy this woman her
Amiga?! It's not like she's asking for a Cray X-MP supercomputer mainframe;
an Amiga's a sweet little cookie-box thing. We're losing zillions in organized
fraud; prosecuting and defending a single hacker case in court can cost a
hundred grand easy. How come nobody can come up with four lousy grand so
this woman can do her job? For a hundred grand we could buy every computer
cop in America an Amiga. There aren't that many of 'em.
Computers. The lust, the hunger, for computers. The loyalty they
inspire, the intense sense of possessiveness. The culture they have bred. I
myself am sitting in downtown Phoenix, Arizona because it suddenly occurred
to me that the police might -- just might -- come and take away my computer.
The prospect of this, the mere implied threat, was unbearable. It literally
changed my life. It was changing the lives of many others. Eventually it would
change everybody's life.
Gail Thackeray was one of the top computercrime people in America.
And I was just some novelist, and yet I had a better computer than hers.
Practically everybody I knew had a better computer than Gail Thackeray and
her feeble laptop 286. It was like sending the sheriff in to clean up Dodge City
and arming her with a slingshot cut from an old rubber tire.
But then again, you don't need a howitzer to enforce the law. You can do
a lot just with a badge. With a badge alone, you can basically wreak havoc, take
a terrible vengeance on wrongdoers. Ninety percent of "computer crime
investigation" is just "crime investigation:" names, places, dossiers, modus
operandi, search warrants, victims, complainants, informants...
What will computer crime look like in ten years? Will it get better? Did
"Sundevil" send 'em reeling back in confusion?
It'll be like it is now, only worse, she tells me with perfect conviction.
Still there in the background, ticking along, changing with the times: the
criminal underworld. It'll be like drugs are. Like our problems with alcohol.
All the cops and laws in the world never solved our problems with alcohol. If
there's something people want, a certain percentage of them are just going to
take it. Fifteen percent of the populace will never steal. Fifteen percent will
steal most anything not nailed down. The battle is for the hearts and minds of
the remaining seventy percent.
And criminals catch on fast. If there's not "too steep a learning curve" --
if it doesn't require a baffling amount of expertise and practice -- then criminals
are often some of the first through the gate of a new technology. Especially if it
helps them to hide. They have tons of cash, criminals. The new
communications tech -- like pagers, cellular phones, faxes, Federal Express --
were pioneered by rich corporate people, and by criminals. In the early years of
pagers and beepers, dope dealers were so enthralled this technology that owing a
beeper was practically prima facie evidence of cocaine dealing. CB radio
exploded when the speed limit hit 55 and breaking the highway law became a
national pastime. Dope dealers send cash by Federal Express, despite, or
perhaps because of, the warnings in FedEx offices that tell you never to try
this. Fed Ex uses X-rays and dogs on their mail, to stop drug shipments. That
doesn't work very well.
Drug dealers went wild over cellular phones. There are simple methods
of faking ID on cellular phones, making the location of the call mobile, free of
charge, and effectively untraceable. Now victimized cellular companies
routinely bring in vast toll-lists of calls to Colombia and Pakistan.
Judge Greene's fragmentation of the phone company is driving law
enforcement nuts. Four thousand telecommunications companies. Fraud
skyrocketing. Every temptation in the world available with a phone and a
credit card number. Criminals untraceable. A galaxy of
"new neat rotten things to do."
Judge Greene's fragmentation of the phone
company is driving law enforcement nuts. Four thousand
telecommunications companies. Fraud skyrocketing. Every temptation
in the world available with a phone and a credit card
number. Criminals untraceable. A galaxy of "new neat rotten things to
do."
If there were one thing Thackeray would like
to have, it would be an effective legal end-run through this new
fragmentation minefield.
It would be a new form of electronic search
warrant, an "electronic letter of marque" to be issued by a judge. It
would create a new category of "electronic emergency." Like a
wiretap, its use would be rare, but it would cut across state lines
and force swift cooperation from all concerned. Cellular, phone,
laser, computer network, PBXes, AT&T, Baby Bells, long-distance
entrepreneurs, packet radio. Some document, some mighty court-order,
that could slice through four thousand separate forms of corporate
red-tape, and get her at once to the source of calls, the source of
email threats and viruses, the sources of bomb threats, kidnapping
threats. "From now on," she says, "the Lindberg baby will always
die."
Something that would make the Net sit still,
if only for a moment. Something that would get her up to speed.
Seven league boots. That's what she really needs. "Those guys move
in nanoseconds and I'm on the Pony Express." And then, too, there's
the coming international angle. Electronic crime has never been easy
to localize, to tie to a physical jurisdiction. And phone phreaks and
hackers loathe boundaries, they jump them whenever they can. The
English. The Dutch. And the Germans, especially the ubiquitous Chaos
Computer Club. The Australians. They've all learned phone-phreaking
from America. It's a growth mischief industry. The multinational
networks are global, but governments and the police simply aren't.
Neither are the laws. Or the legal frameworks for citizen protection.
One language is global, though -
English. Phone phreaks speak English; it's their native tongue even if
they're Germans. English may have started in England but now it's the
Net language; it might as well be called "CNNese."
Asians just aren't much into phone
phreaking. They're the world masters at organized software piracy.
The French aren't into phone-phreaking either. The French are into
computerized industrial espionage.
In the old days of the MIT righteous
hackerdom, crashing systems didn't hurt anybody. Not all that much,
anyway. Not permanently. Now the players are more venal. Now the
consequences are worse. Hacking will begin killing people soon.
Already there are methods of stacking calls onto 911 systems, annoying
the police, and possibly causing the death of some poor soul calling
in with a genuine emergency. Hackers in Amtrak computers, or
airtraffic control computers, will kill somebody someday. Maybe a lot
of people. Gail Thackeray expects it.
And the viruses are getting nastier. The
"Scud" virus is the latest one out. It wipes hard-disks.
According to Thackeray, the idea that
phonephreaks are Robin Hoods is a fraud. They don't deserve this
repute. Basically, they pick on the weak. AT&T now protects
itself with the fearsome ANI (Automatic Number Identification) trace
capability. When AT&T wised up and tightened security generally,
the phreaks drifted into the Baby Bells. The Baby Bells lashed out in
1989 and 1990, so the phreaks switched to smaller long-distance
entrepreneurs. Today, they are moving into locally owned PBXes and
voice-mail systems, which are full of security holes, dreadfully easy
to hack. These victims aren't the moneybags Sheriff of Nottingham or
Bad King John, but small groups of innocent people who find it hard to
protect themselves, and who really suffer from these depredations.
Phone phreaks pick on the weak. They do it for power. If it were
legal, they wouldn't do it. They don't want service, or knowledge,
they want the thrill of powertripping. There's plenty of knowledge or
service around, if you're willing to pay. Phone phreaks don't pay,
they steal. It's because it is illegal that it feels like power, that
it gratifies their vanity.
I leave Gail Thackeray with a handshake at the
door of her office building - a vast International Style office
building downtown. The Sheriff's office is renting part of it. I get
the vague impression that quite a lot of the building is empty - real
estate crash. In a Phoenix sports apparel store, in a downtown mall, I
meet the "Sun Devil" himself. He is the cartoon mascot of Arizona
State University, whose football stadium, "Sundevil," is near the
local Secret Service HQ - hence the name Operation Sundevil. The Sun
Devil himself is named "Sparky." Sparky the Sun Devil is maroon and
bright yellow, the school colors. Sparky brandishes a three-tined
yellow pitchfork. He has a small mustache, pointed ears, a barbed
tail, and is dashing forward jabbing the air with the pitchfork, with
an expression of devilish glee.
Phoenix was the home of Operation
Sundevil. The Legion of Doom ran a hacker bulletin board called "The
Phoenix Project." An Australian hacker named "Phoenix" once burrowed
through the Internet to attack Cliff Stoll, then bragged and boasted
about it to The New York Times. This net of coincidence is both
odd and meaningless.
The headquarters of the Arizona Attorney
General, Gail Thackeray's former workplace, is on 1275 Washington
Avenue. Many of the downtown streets in Phoenix are named after
prominent American presidents: Washington, Jefferson, Madison...
After dark, all the employees go home to their
suburbs. Washington, Jefferson and Madison - what would be the
Phoenix inner city, if there were an inner city in this sprawling
automobile-bred town - become the haunts of transients and
derelicts. The homeless. The sidewalks along Washington are lined with
orange trees. Ripe fallen fruit lies scattered like croquet balls on
the sidewalks and gutters. No one seems to be eating them. I try a
fresh one. It tastes unbearably bitter.
The Attorney General's office, built in 1981
during the Babbitt administration, is a long low two story building of
white cement and wall-sized sheets of curtain-glass. Behind each
glass wall is a lawyer's office, quite open and visible to anyone
strolling by. Across the street is a dour government building labelled
simply ECONOMIC SECURITY, something that has not been in great supply
in the American Southwest lately.
The offices are about twelve feet square.
They feature tall wooden cases full of red-spined lawbooks; Wang
computer monitors; telephones; Post-it notes galore. Also framed law
diplomas and a general excess of bad Western landscape art. Ansel
Adams photos are a big favorite, perhaps to compensate for the dismal
specter of the parking lot, two acres of striped black asphalt, which
features gravel landscaping and some sickly-looking barrel cacti.
It has grown dark. Gail Thackeray has told me
that the people who work late here, are afraid of muggings in the
parking lot. It seems cruelly ironic that a woman tracing electronic
racketeers across the interstate labyrinth of Cyberspace should fear
an assault by a homeless derelict in the parking lot of her own
workplace.
Perhaps this is less than coincidence.
Perhaps these two seemingly disparate worlds are somehow generating
one another. The poor and disenfranchised take to the streets, while
the rich and computer-equipped, safe in their bedrooms, chatter over
their modems. Quite often the derelicts kick the glass out and break
in to the lawyers' offices, if they see something they need or want
badly enough. I cross the parking lot to the street behind the
Attorney General's office. A pair of young tramps are bedding down on
flattened sheets of cardboard, under an alcove stretching over the
sidewalk. One tramp wears a glitter-covered T-shirt reading
"CALIFORNIA" in Coca-Cola cursive. His nose and cheeks look chafed
and swollen; they glisten with what seems to be Vaseline. The other
tramp has a ragged long-sleeved shirt and lank brown hair parted in
the middle. They both wear blue jeans coated in grime. They are both
drunk. "You guys crash here a lot?" I ask them.
They look at me warily. I am wearing black
jeans, a black pinstriped suit jacket and a black silk tie. I have
odd shoes and a funny haircut.
"It's our first time here," says the red-nosed
tramp unconvincingly. There is a lot of cardboard stacked here. More
than any two people could use.
"We usually stay at the Vinnie's down the
street," says the brown-haired tramp, puffing a Marlboro with a
meditative air, as he sprawls with his head on a blue nylon backpack.
"The Saint Vincent's." "You know who works in that building over
there?" I ask, pointing. The brown-haired tramp shrugs. "Some kind
of attorneys, it says."
We urge one another to take it easy. I give
them five bucks. A block down the street I meet a vigorous workman who
is wheeling along some kind of industrial trolley; it has what appears
to be a tank of propane on it.
We make eye contact. We nod politely. I walk
past him. "Hey! Excuse me sir!" he says.
"Yes?" I say, stopping and turning.
"Have you seen," the guy says rapidly, "a
black guy, about 6'7", scars on both his cheeks like this -" he
gestures - "wears a black baseball cap on backwards, wandering around
here anyplace?"
"Sounds like I don't much want to meet
him," I say.
"He took my wallet," says my new
acquaintance. "Took it this morning. Y'know, some people would be
scared of a guy like that. But I'm not scared. I'm from
Chicago. I'm gonna hunt him down. We do things like that in
Chicago."
"Yeah?"
"I went to the cops and now he's got an APB
out on his ass," he says with satisfaction. "You run into him, you
let me know." "Okay," I say. "What is your name, sir?"
"Stanley..."
"And how can I reach you?"
"Oh," Stanley says, in the same rapid voice,
"you don't have to reach, uh, me. You can just call the cops. Go
straight to the cops." He reaches into a pocket and pulls out a greasy
piece of pasteboard. "See, here's my report on him."
I look. The "report," the size of an index
card, is labelled PRO-ACT: Phoenix Residents Opposing Active Crime
Threat... or is it Organized Against Crime Threat? In the darkening
street it's hard to read. Some kind of vigilante group? Neighborhood
watch? I feel very puzzled.
"Are you a police officer, sir?"
He smiles, seems very pleased by the question.
"No," he says.
"But you are a `Phoenix Resident?"'
"Would you believe a homeless person," Stanley
says.
"Really? But what's with the..." For the
first time I take a close look at Stanley's trolley. It's a
rubber-wheeled thing of industrial metal, but the device I had
mistaken for a tank of propane is in fact a water-cooler. Stanley
also has an Army duffel-bag, stuffed tight as a sausage with clothing
or perhaps a tent, and, at the base of his trolley, a cardboard box
and a battered leather briefcase.
"I see," I say, quite at a loss. For the
first time I notice that Stanley has a wallet. He has not lost his
wallet at all. It is in his back pocket and chained to his belt.
It's not a new wallet. It seems to have seen a lot of wear.
"Well, you know how it is, brother," says
Stanley. Now that I know that he is homeless - a possible
threat - my entire perception of him has changed in an instant.
His speech, which once seemed just bright and enthusiastic, now seems
to have a dangerous tang of mania. "I have to do this!" he assures
me. "Track this guy down... It's a thing I do... you know... to keep
myself together!" He smiles, nods, lifts his trolley by its decaying
rubber handgrips.
"Gotta work together, y'know," Stanley booms,
his face alight with cheerfulness, "the police can't do everything!"
The gentlemen I met in my stroll in downtown
Phoenix are the only computer illiterates in this book. To regard
them as irrelevant, however, would be a grave mistake.
As computerization spreads across society, the
populace at large is subjected to wave after wave of future shock.
But, as a necessary converse, the "computer community" itself is
subjected to wave after wave of incoming computer illiterates. How
will those currently enjoying America's digital bounty regard, and
treat, all this teeming refuse yearning to breathe free? Will the
electronic frontier be another Land of Opportunity - or an armed and
monitored enclave, where the disenfranchised snuggle on their
cardboard at the locked doors of our houses of justice?
Some people just don't get along with
computers. They can't read. They can't type. They just don't have
it in their heads to master arcane instructions in wirebound manuals.
Somewhere, the process of computerization of the populace will reach a
limit. Some people - quite decent people maybe, who might have
thrived in any other situation - will be left irretrievably outside
the bounds. What's to be done with these people, in the bright new
shiny electroworld? How will they be regarded, by the mouse-whizzing
masters of cyberspace? With contempt? Indifference? Fear?
In retrospect, it astonishes me to realize how
quickly poor Stanley became a perceived threat. Surprise and fear are
closely allied feelings. And the world of computing is full of
surprises.
I met one character in the streets of Phoenix
whose role in those book is supremely and directly relevant. That
personage was Stanley's giant thieving scarred phantom. This phantasm
is everywhere in this book. He is the specter haunting cyberspace.
Sometimes he's a maniac vandal ready to smash
the phone system for no sane reason at all. Sometimes he's a fascist
fed, coldly programming his mighty mainframes to destroy our Bill of
Rights. Sometimes he's a telco bureaucrat, covertly conspiring to
register all modems in the service of an Orwellian surveillance
regime. Mostly, though, this fearsome phantom is a "hacker." He's
strange, he doesn't belong, he's not authorized, he doesn't smell
right, he's not keeping his proper place, he's not one of us. The
focus of fear is the hacker, for much the same reasons that Stanley's
fancied assailant is black.
Stanley's demon can't go away, because he
doesn't exist. Despite singleminded and tremendous effort, he can't
be arrested, sued, jailed, or fired. The only constructive way to do
anything about him is to learn more about Stanley himself. This
learning process may be repellent, it may be ugly, it may involve
grave elements of paranoiac confusion, but it's necessary. Knowing
Stanley requires something more than class-crossing condescension. It
requires more than steely legal objectivity. It requires human
compassion and sympathy. To know Stanley is to know his demon. If
you know the other guy's demon, then maybe you'll come to know some of
your own. You'll be able to separate reality from illusion. And then
you won't do your cause, and yourself, more harm than good. Like poor
damned Stanley from Chicago did.
5.
The Federal Computer Investigations Committee (FCIC) is the most
important and influential organization in the realm of American computer-crime.
Since the police of other countries have largely taken their computer-crime cues
from American methods, the FCIC might well be called the most important
computer crime group in the world.
It is also, by federal standards, an organization of great unorthodoxy.
State and local investigators mix with federal agents. Lawyers, financial
auditors and computer-security programmers trade notes with street cops.
Industry vendors and telco security people show up to explain their gadgetry and
plead for protection and justice. Private investigators, think-tank experts and
industry pundits throw in their two cents' worth. The FCIC is the antithesis of a
formal bureaucracy. Members of the FCIC are obscurely proud of this fact; they
recognize their group as aberrant, but are entirely convinced that this, for them,
outright *weird* behavior is nevertheless *absolutely necessary* to get their
jobs done.
FCIC regulars -- from the Secret Service, the FBI, the IRS, the
Department of Labor, the offices of federal attorneys, state police, the Air Force,
from military intelligence -- often attend meetings, held hither and thither across
the country, at their own expense. The FCIC doesn't get grants. It doesn't
charge membership fees. It doesn't have a boss. It has no headquarters -- just a
mail drop in Washington DC, at the Fraud Division of the Secret Service. It
doesn't have a budget. It doesn't have schedules. It meets three times a year --
sort of. Sometimes it issues publications, but the FCIC has no regular publisher,
no treasurer, not even a secretary. There are no minutes of FCIC meetings.
Non-federal people are considered "non-voting members," but there's not much
in the way of elections. There are no badges, lapel pins or certificates of
membership. Everyone is on a firstname basis. There are about forty of them.
Nobody knows how many, exactly. People come, people go -sometimes people
"go" formally but still hang around anyway. Nobody has ever exactly figured
out what "membership" of this "Committee" actually entails.
Strange as this may seem to some, to anyone familiar with the social
world of computing, the "organization" of the FCIC is very recognizable.
For years now, economists and management theorists have speculated
that the tidal wave of the information revolution would destroy rigid, pyramidal
bureaucracies, where everything is topdown and centrally controlled. Highly
trained "employees" would take on much greater autonomy, being self-starting,
and self-motivating, moving from place to place, task to task, with great speed
and fluidity. "Ad-hocracy" would rule, with groups of people spontaneously
knitting together across organizational lines, tackling the problem at hand,
applying intense computer-aided expertise to it, and then vanishing whence they
came.
This is more or less what has actually happened in the world of federal
computer investigation. With the conspicuous exception of the phone
companies, which are after all over a hundred years old, practically *every*
organization that plays any important role in this book functions just like the
FCIC. The Chicago Task Force, the Arizona Racketeering Unit, the Legion of
Doom, the Phrack crowd, the Electronic Frontier Foundation -- they *all* look
and act like "tiger teams" or "user's groups." They are all electronic ad-hocracies
leaping up spontaneously to attempt to meet a need.
Some are police. Some are, by strict definition, criminals. Some are
political interest-groups. But every single group has that same quality of
apparent spontaneity -- "Hey, gang! My uncle's got a barn -let's put on a show!"
Every one of these groups is embarrassed by this "amateurism," and, for
the sake of their public image in a world of non-computer people, they all
attempt to look as stern and formal and impressive as possible. These
electronic frontier-dwellers resemble groups of nineteenth-century pioneers
hankering after the respectability of statehood. There are however, two crucial
differences in the historical experience of these "pioneers" of the nineteeth and
twenty-first centuries.
First, powerful information technology *does* play into the hands of
small, fluid, loosely organized groups. There have always been "pioneers,"
"hobbyists," "amateurs," "dilettantes," "volunteers," "movements," "users'
groups" and "blue-ribbon panels of experts" around. But a group of this kind -
when technically equipped to ship huge amounts of specialized information, at
lightning speed, to its members, to government, and to the press -- is simply a
different kind of animal. It's like the difference between an eel and an
electric eel.
The second crucial change is that American society is currently in a state
approaching permanent technological revolution. In the world of computers
particularly, it is practically impossible to *ever* stop being a "pioneer," unless
you either drop dead or deliberately jump off the bus. The scene has never
slowed down enough to become well-institutionalized. And after twenty, thirty,
forty years the "computer revolution" continues to spread, to permeate new
corners of society. Anything that really works is already obsolete.
If you spend your entire working life as a "pioneer," the word "pioneer"
begins to lose its meaning. Your way of life looks less and less like an
introduction to "something else" more stable and organized, and more and more
like *just the way things are.* A "permanent revolution" is really a
contradiction in terms. If "turmoil" lasts long enough, it simply becomes *a
new kind of society* -still the same game of history, but new players, new rules.
Apply this to the world of late twentieth-century law enforcement, and the
implications are novel and puzzling indeed. Any bureaucratic rulebook you
write about computer-crime will be flawed when you write it, and almost an
antique by the time it sees print. The fluidity and fast reactions of the FCIC
give them a great advantage in this regard, which explains their success. Even
with the best will in the world (which it does not, in fact, possess) it is
impossible for an organization the size of the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation to get up to speed on the theory and practice of computer crime. If
they tried to train all their agents to do this, it would be *suicidal,* as they
would *never be able to do anything else.*
The FBI does try to train its agents in the basics of electronic crime, at
their base in Quantico, Virginia. And the Secret Service, along with many other
law enforcement groups, runs quite successful and well-attended training
courses on wire fraud, business crime, and computer intrusion at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC, pronounced "fletsy") in Glynco,
Georgia. But the best efforts of these bureaucracies does not remove the
absolute need for a "cutting-edge mess" like the FCIC.
For you see -- the members of FCIC *are* the trainers of the rest of law
enforcement. Practically and literally speaking, they are the Glynco computer-
crime faculty by another name. If the FCIC went over a cliff on a bus, the U.S.
law enforcement community would be rendered deaf dumb and blind in the
world of computer crime, and would swiftly feel a desperate need to reinvent
them. And this is no time to go starting from scratch.
On June 11, 1991, I once again arrived in Phoenix, Arizona, for the latest
meeting of the Federal Computer Investigations Committee. This was more or
less the twentieth meeting of this stellar group. The count was uncertain, since
nobody could figure out whether to include the meetings of "the Colluquy,"
which is what the FCIC was called in the mid-1980s before it had even managed
to obtain the dignity of its own acronym.
Since my last visit to Arizona, in May, the local AzScam bribery scandal
had resolved itself in a general muddle of humiliation. The Phoenix chief of
police, whose agents had videotaped nine state legislators up to no good, had
resigned his office in a tussle with the Phoenix city council over the propriety of
his undercover operations.
The Phoenix Chief could now join Gail Thackeray and eleven of her
closest associates in the shared experience of politically motivated
unemployment. As of June, resignations were still continuing at the Arizona
Attorney General's office, which could be interpreted as either a New Broom
Sweeping Clean or a Night of the Long Knives Part II, depending on your point
of view.
The meeting of FCIC was held at the Scottsdale Hilton Resort. Scottsdale
is a wealthy suburb of Phoenix, known as "Scottsdull" to scoffing local trendies,
but well-equipped with posh shoppingmalls and manicured lawns, while
conspicuously undersupplied with homeless derelicts. The Scottsdale Hilton
Resort was a sprawling hotel in postmodern crypto-Southwestern style. It
featured a "mission bell tower" plated in turquoise tile and vaguely resembling a
Saudi minaret.
Inside it was all barbarically striped Santa Fe Style decor. There was a
health spa downstairs and a large oddly-shaped pool in the patio. A poolside
umbrella-stand offered Ben and Jerry's politically correct Peace Pops.
I registered as a member of FCIC, attaining a handy discount rate, then
went in search of the Feds. Sure enough, at the back of the hotel grounds came
the unmistakable sound of Gail Thackeray holding forth.
Since I had also attended the Computers Freedom and Privacy
conference (about which more later), this was the second time I had seen
Thackeray in a group of her law enforcement colleagues. Once again I was
struck by how simply pleased they seemed to see her. It was natural that she'd
get *some* attention, as Gail was one of two women in a group of some thirty
men; but there was a lot more to it than that.
Gail Thackeray personifies the social glue of the FCIC. They could give
a damn about her losing her job with the Attorney General. They were sorry
about it, of course, but hell, they'd all lost jobs. If they were the kind of guys
who liked steady boring jobs, they would never have gotten into computer work
in the first place.
I wandered into her circle and was immediately introduced to five
strangers. The conditions of my visit at FCIC were reviewed. I would not quote
anyone directly. I would not tie opinions expressed to the agencies of the
attendees. I would not (a purely hypothetical example) report the conversation
of a guy from the Secret Service talking quite civilly to a guy from the FBI, as
these two agencies *never* talk to each other, and the IRS (also present, also
hypothetical) *never talks to anybody.*
Worse yet, I was forbidden to attend the first conference. And I didn't. I
have no idea what the FCIC was up to behind closed doors that afternoon. I
rather suspect that they were engaging in a frank and thorough confession of
their errors, goof-ups and blunders, as this has been a feature of every FCIC
meeting since their legendary Memphis beer bust of 1986. Perhaps the single
greatest attraction of FCIC is that it is a place where you can go, let your hair
down, and completely level with people who actually comprehend what you are
talking about. Not only do they understand you, but they *really pay attention,*
they are *grateful for your insights,* and they *forgive you,* which in nine
cases out of ten is something even your boss can't do, because as soon as you
start talking "ROM," "BBS," or "T-1 trunk," his eyes glaze over. I had nothing
much to do that afternoon. The FCIC were beavering away in their conference
room. Doors were firmly closed, windows too dark to peer through. I wondered
what a real hacker, a computer intruder, would do at a meeting like this.
The answer came at once. He would "trash" the place. Not reduce the
place to trash in some orgy of vandalism; that's not the use of the term in the
hacker milieu. No, he would quietly *empty the trash baskets* and silently raid
any valuable data indiscreetly thrown away.
Journalists have been known to do this. (Journalists hunting information
have been known to do almost every single unethical thing that hackers have
ever done. They also throw in a few awful techniques all their own.) The
legality of 'trashing' is somewhat dubious but it is not in fact flagrantly illegal.
It was, however, absurd to contemplate trashing the FCIC. These people knew
all about trashing. I wouldn't last fifteen seconds.
The idea sounded interesting, though. I'd been hearing a lot about the
practice lately. On the spur of the moment, I decided I would try trashing the
office *across the hall* from the FCIC, an area which had nothing to do with
the investigators.
The office was tiny; six chairs, a table.... Nevertheless, it was open, so I
dug around in its plastic trash can.
To my utter astonishment, I came up with the torn scraps of a SPRINT
long-distance phone bill. More digging produced a bank statement and the
scraps of a hand-written letter, along with gum, cigarette ashes, candy wrappers
and a day-old-issue of USA TODAY.
The trash went back in its receptacle while the scraps of data went into
my travel bag. I detoured through the hotel souvenir shop for some Scotch tape
and went up to my room.
Coincidence or not, it was quite true. Some poor soul had, in fact,
thrown a SPRINT bill into the hotel's trash. Date May 1991, total amount due:
$252.36. Not a business phone, either, but a residential bill, in the name of
someone called Evelyn (not her real name). Evelyn's records showed a ## PAST
DUE BILL ##! Here was her nine-digit account ID. Here was a stern
computer-printed warning: "TREAT YOUR FONCARD AS YOU WOULD
ANY CREDIT CARD. TO SECURE AGAINST FRAUD, NEVER GIVE
YOUR FONCARD NUMBER OVER THE PHONE UNLESS YOU
INITIATED THE CALL. IF YOU RECEIVE SUSPICIOUS CALLS PLEASE
NOTIFY CUSTOMER SERVICE IMMEDIATELY!"
I examined my watch. Still plenty of time left for the FCIC to carry on. I
sorted out the scraps of Evelyn's SPRINT bill and re-assembled them with fresh
Scotch tape. Here was her ten-digit FONCARD number. Didn't seem to have
the ID number necessary to cause real fraud trouble.
I did, however, have Evelyn's home phone number. And the phone
numbers for a whole crowd of Evelyn's long-distance friends and acquaintances.
In San Diego, Folsom, Redondo, Las Vegas, La Jolla, Topeka, and Northampton
Massachusetts. Even somebody in Australia!
I examined other documents. Here was a bank statement. It was
Evelyn's IRA account down at a bank in San Mateo California (total balance
$1877.20). Here was a charge-card bill for $382.64. She was paying it off bit by
bit.
Driven by motives that were completely unethical and prurient, I now
examined the handwritten notes. They had been torn fairly thoroughly, so much
so that it took me almost an entire five minutes to reassemble them.
They were drafts of a love letter. They had been written on the lined
stationery of Evelyn's employer, a biomedical company. Probably written at
work when she should have been doing something else.
"Dear Bob," (not his real name) "I guess in everyone's life there comes a
time when hard decisions have to be made, and this is a difficult one for me --
very upsetting. Since you haven't called me, and I don't understand why, I can
only surmise it's because you don't want to. I thought I would have heard from
you Friday. I did have a few unusual problems with my phone and possibly you
tried, I hope so.
"Robert, you asked me to 'let go'..."
The first note ended. *Unusual problems with her phone?* I looked
swiftly at the next note. "Bob, not hearing from you for the whole weekend has
left me very perplexed..."
Next draft. "Dear Bob, there is so much I don't understand right now, and
I wish I did. I wish I could talk to you, but for some unknown reason you have
elected not to call -- this is so difficult for me to understand..."
She tried again.
"Bob, Since I have always held you in such high esteem, I had every
hope that we could remain good friends, but now one essential ingredient is
missing - respect. Your ability to discard people when their purpose is served is
appalling to me. The kindest thing you could do for me now is to leave me
alone. You are no longer welcome in my heart or home..."
Try again.
"Bob, I wrote a very factual note to you to say how much respect I had
lost for you, by the way you treat people, me in particular, so uncaring and cold.
The kindest thing you can do for me is to leave me alone entirely, as you are no
longer welcome in my heart or home. I would appreciate it if you could retire
your debt to me as soon as possible -- I wish no link to you in any way.
Sincerely, Evelyn."
Good heavens, I thought, the bastard actually owes her money! I turned
to the next page.
"Bob: very simple. GOODBYE! No more mind games -- no more
fascination -- no more coldness -no more respect for you! It's over -- Finis.
Evie"
There were two versions of the final brushoff letter, but they read about
the same. Maybe she hadn't sent it. The final item in my illicit and shameful
booty was an envelope addressed to "Bob" at his home address, but it had no
stamp on it and it hadn't been mailed.
Maybe she'd just been blowing off steam because her rascal boyfriend
had neglected to call her one weekend. Big deal. Maybe they'd kissed and
made up, maybe she and Bob were down at Pop's Chocolate Shop now, sharing
a malted. Sure.
Easy to find out. All I had to do was call Evelyn up. With a half-clever
story and enough brass- plated gall I could probably trick the truth out of her.
Phone-phreaks and hackers deceive people over the phone all the time. It's
called "social engineering." Social engineering is a very common practice in the
underground, and almost magically effective. Human beings are almost always
the weakest link in computer security. The simplest way to learn Things You
Are Not Meant To Know is simply to call up and exploit the knowledgeable
people. With social engineering, you use the bits of specialized knowledge you
already have as a key, to manipulate people into believing that you are
legitimate. You can then coax, flatter, or frighten them into revealing almost
anything you want to know. Deceiving people (especially over the phone) is
easy and fun. Exploiting their gullibility is very gratifying; it makes you feel very
superior to them. If I'd been a malicious hacker on a trashing raid, I would now
have Evelyn very much in my power. Given all this inside data, it wouldn't take
much effort at all to invent a convincing lie. If I were ruthless enough, and jaded
enough, and clever enough, this momentary indiscretion of hers -maybe
committed in tears, who knows -- could cause her a whole world of confusion
and grief.
I didn't even have to have a *malicious* motive. Maybe I'd be "on her
side," and call up Bob instead, and anonymously threaten to break both his
kneecaps if he didn't take Evelyn out for a steak dinner pronto. It was still
profoundly *none of my business.* To have gotten this knowledge at all was a
sordid act and to use it would be to inflict a sordid injury.
To do all these awful things would require exactly zero high-tech
expertise. All it would take was the willingness to do it and a certain amount of
bent imagination. I went back downstairs. The hard-working FCIC, who had
labored forty-five minutes over their schedule, were through for the day, and
adjourned to the hotel bar. We all had a beer.
I had a chat with a guy about "Isis," or rather IACIS, the International
Association of Computer Investigation Specialists. They're into "computer
forensics," the techniques of picking computersystems apart without destroying
vital evidence. IACIS, currently run out of Oregon, is comprised of investigators
in the U.S., Canada, Taiwan and Ireland. "Taiwan and Ireland?" I said. Are
*Taiwan* and *Ireland* really in the forefront of this stuff? Well not exactly,
my informant admitted. They just happen to have been the first ones to have
caught on by word of mouth. Still, the international angle counts, because this is
obviously an international problem. Phone-lines go everywhere.
There was a Mountie here from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He
seemed to be having quite a good time. Nobody had flung this Canadian out
because he might pose a foreign security risk. These are cyberspace cops. They
still worry a lot about "jurisdictions," but mere geography is the least of their
troubles. NASA had failed to show. NASA suffers a lot from computer
intrusions, in particular from Australian raiders and a well-trumpeted Chaos
Computer Club case, and in 1990 there was a brief press flurry when it was
revealed that one of NASA's Houston branch-exchanges had been systematically
ripped off by a gang of phone-phreaks. But the NASA guys had had their
funding cut. They were stripping everything.
Air Force OSI, its Office of Special Investigations, is the *only* federal
entity dedicated full-time to computer security. They'd been expected to show
up in force, but some of them had cancelled -- a Pentagon budget pinch.
As the empties piled up, the guys began joshing around and telling war-
stories. "These are cops," Thackeray said tolerantly. "If they're not talking shop
they talk about women and beer."
I heard the story about the guy who, asked for "a copy" of a computer
disk, *photocopied the label on it.* He put the floppy disk onto the glass plate
of a photocopier. The blast of static when the copier worked completely erased
all the real information on the disk.
Some other poor souls threw a whole bag of confiscated diskettes into
the squad-car trunk next to the police radio. The powerful radio signal blasted
them, too. We heard a bit about Dave Geneson, the first computer prosecutor, a
mainframe-runner in Dade County, turned lawyer. Dave Geneson was one guy
who had hit the ground running, a signal virtue in making the transition to
computer-crime. It was generally agreed that it was easier to learn the world of
computers first, then police or prosecutorial work. You could take certain
computer people and train 'em to successful police work -- but of course they
had to have the *cop mentality.* They had to have street smarts. Patience.
Persistence. And discretion. You've got to make sure they're not hotshots,
show-offs, "cowboys."
Most of the folks in the bar had backgrounds in military intelligence, or
drugs, or homicide. It was rudely opined that "military intelligence" was a
contradiction in terms, while even the grisly world of homicide was considered
cleaner than drug enforcement. One guy had been 'way undercover doing dope-
work in Europe for four years straight. "I'm almost recovered now," he said
deadpan, with the acid black humor that is pure cop. "Hey, now I can say
*fucker* without putting *mother* in front of it."
"In the cop world," another guy said earnestly, "everything is good and
bad, black and white. In the computer world everything is gray."
One guy -- a founder of the FCIC, who'd been with the group since it was
just the Colluquy -described his own introduction to the field. He'd been a
Washington DC homicide guy called in on a "hacker" case. From the word
"hacker," he naturally assumed he was on the trail of a knife-wielding marauder,
and went to the computer center expecting blood and a body. When he finally
figured out what was happening there (after loudly demanding, in vain, that the
programmers "speak English"), he called headquarters and told them he was
clueless about computers. They told him nobody else knew diddly either, and to
get the hell back to work.
So, he said, he had proceeded by comparisons. By analogy. By
metaphor. "Somebody broke in to your computer, huh?" Breaking and entering;
I can understand that. How'd he get in? "Over the phonelines." Harassing
phone-calls, I can understand that! What we need here is a tap and a trace!
It worked. It was better than nothing. And it worked a lot faster when
he got hold of another cop who'd done something similar. And then the two of
them got another, and another, and pretty soon the Colluquy was a happening
thing. It helped a lot that everybody seemed to know Carlton Fitzpatrick, the
data-processing trainer in Glynco.
The ice broke big-time in Memphis in '86. The Colluquy had attracted a
bunch of new guys -- Secret Service, FBI, military, other feds, heavy guys.
Nobody wanted to tell anybody anything. They suspected that if word got back
to the home office they'd all be fired. They passed an uncomfortably guarded
afternoon.
The formalities got them nowhere. But after the formal session was
over, the organizers brought in a case of beer. As soon as the participants
knocked it off with the bureaucratic ranks and turf-fighting, everything changed.
"I bared my soul," one veteran reminisced proudly. By nightfall they were
building pyramids of empty beer-cans and doing everything but composing a
team fight song.
FCIC were not the only computer-crime people around. There was
DATTA (District Attorneys' Technology Theft Association), though they mostly
specialized in chip theft, intellectual property, and black-market cases. There
was HTCIA (High Tech Computer Investigators Association), also out in
Silicon Valley, a year older than FCIC and featuring brilliant people like Donald
Ingraham. There was LEETAC (Law Enforcement Electronic Technology
Assistance Committee) in Florida, and computercrime units in Illinois and
Maryland and Texas and Ohio and Colorado and Pennsylvania. But these were
local groups. FCIC were the first to really network nationally and on a federal
level.
FCIC people live on the phone lines. Not on bulletin board systems --
they know very well what boards are, and they know that boards aren't secure.
Everyone in the FCIC has a voice-phone bill like you wouldn't believe. FCIC
people have been tight with the telco people for a long time. Telephone
cyberspace is their native habitat.
FCIC has three basic sub-tribes: the trainers, the security people, and the
investigators. That's why it's called an "Investigations Committee" with no
mention of the term "computer-crime" -- the dreaded "C-word." FCIC,
officially, is "an association of agencies rather than individuals;" unofficially,
this field is small enough that the influence of individuals and individual
expertise is paramount. Attendance is by invitation only, and most everyone in
FCIC considers himself a prophet without honor in his own house.
Again and again I heard this, with different terms but identical
sentiments. "I'd been sitting in the wilderness talking to myself." "I was totally
isolated." "I was desperate." "FCIC is the best thing there is about computer
crime in America." "FCIC is what really works." "This is where you hear real
people telling you what's really happening out there, not just lawyers picking
nits." "We taught each other everything we knew."
The sincerity of these statements convinces me that this is true. FCIC is
the real thing and it is invaluable. It's also very sharply at odds with the rest of
the traditions and power structure in American law enforcement. There
probably hasn't been anything around as loose and go-getting as the FCIC since
the start of the U.S. Secret Service in the 1860s. FCIC people are living like
twenty-firstcentury people in a twentieth-century environment, and while there's
a great deal to be said for that, there's also a great deal to be said against it, and
those against it happen to control the budgets. I listened to two FCIC guys from
Jersey compare life histories. One of them had been a biker in a fairly heavy-
duty gang in the 1960s. "Oh, did you know so-and-so?" said the other guy from
Jersey. "Big guy, heavyset?"
"Yeah, I knew him."
"Yeah, he was one of ours. He was our plant in the gang."
"Really? Wow! Yeah, I knew him. Helluva guy."
Thackeray reminisced at length about being tear-gassed blind in the
November 1969 antiwar protests in Washington Circle, covering them for her
college paper. "Oh yeah, I was there," said another cop. "Glad to hear that tear
gas hit somethin'. Haw haw haw." He'd been so blind himself, he confessed,
that later that day he'd arrested a small tree.
FCIC are an odd group, sifted out by coincidence and necessity, and
turned into a new kind of cop. There are a lot of specialized cops in the world --
your bunco guys, your drug guys, your tax guys, but the only group that matches
FCIC for sheer isolation are probably the child-pornography people. Because
they both deal with conspirators who are desperate to exchange forbidden data
and also desperate to hide; and because nobody else in law enforcement even
wants to hear about it.
FCIC people tend to change jobs a lot. They tend not to get the
equipment and training they want and need. And they tend to get sued quite
often.
As the night wore on and a band set up in the bar, the talk grew darker.
Nothing ever gets done in government, someone opined, until there's a
*disaster.* Computing disasters are awful, but there's no denying that they
greatly help the credibility of FCIC people. The Internet Worm, for instance.
"For years we'd been warning about that -but it's nothing compared to what's
coming." They expect horrors, these people. They know that nothing will really
get done until there is a horror.
6.
Next day we heard an extensive briefing from a guy who'd been a
computer cop, gotten into hot water with an Arizona city council, and now
installed computer networks for a living (at a considerable rise in pay). He
talked about pulling fiber-optic networks apart.
Even a single computer, with enough peripherals, is a literal "network" --
a bunch of machines all cabled together, generally with a complexity that puts
stereo units to shame. FCIC people invent and publicize methods of seizing
computers and maintaining their evidence. Simple things, sometimes, but vital
rules of thumb for street cops, who nowadays often stumble across a busy
computer in the midst of a drug investigation or a white-collar bust. For
instance: Photograph the system before you touch it. Label the ends of all the
cables before you detach anything. "Park" the heads on the disk drives before
you move them. Get the diskettes. Don't put the diskettes in magnetic fields.
Don't write on diskettes with ballpoint pens. Get the manuals. Get the printouts.
Get the handwritten notes. Copy data before you look at it, and then examine
the copy instead of the original. Now our lecturer distributed copied diagrams of
a typical LAN or "Local Area Network", which happened to be out of
Connecticut. *One hundred and fifty-nine* desktop computers, each with its
own peripherals. Three "file servers." Five "star couplers" each with thirty-two
ports. One sixteenport coupler off in the corner office. All these machines
talking to each other, distributing electronic mail, distributing software,
distributing, quite possibly, criminal evidence. All linked by highcapacity fiber-
optic cable. A bad guy -- cops talk a lot about "bad guys" -- might be lurking on
PC #47 or #123 and distributing his ill doings onto some dupe's "personal"
machine in another office -- or another floor -- or, quite possibly, two or three
miles away! Or, conceivably, the evidence might be "data-striped" -- split up
into meaningless slivers stored, one by one, on a whole crowd of different disk
drives.
The lecturer challenged us for solutions. I for one was utterly clueless.
As far as I could figure, the Cossacks were at the gate; there were probably more
disks in this single building than were seized during the entirety of Operation
Sundevil.
"Inside informant," somebody said. Right. There's always the human
angle, something easy to forget when contemplating the arcane recesses of high
technology. Cops are skilled at getting people to talk, and computer people,
given a chair and some sustained attention, will talk about their computers till
their throats go raw. There's a case on record of a single question -- "How'd you
do it?" -eliciting a forty-five-minute videotaped confession from a computer
criminal who not only completely incriminated himself but drew helpful
diagrams.
Computer people talk. Hackers *brag.* Phonephreaks talk
*pathologically* -- why else are they stealing phone-codes, if not to natter for
ten hours straight to their friends on an opposite seaboard? Computer-literate
people do in fact possess an arsenal of nifty gadgets and techniques that would
allow them to conceal all kinds of exotic skullduggery, and if they could only
*shut up* about it, they could probably get away with all manner of amazing
information-crimes. But that's just not how it works -- or at least, that's not how
it's worked *so far.*
Most every phone-phreak ever busted has swiftly implicated his mentors,
his disciples, and his friends. Most every white-collar computer-criminal,
smugly convinced that his clever scheme is bulletproof, swiftly learns otherwise
when, for the first time in his life, an actual no-kidding policeman leans over,
grabs the front of his shirt, looks him right in the eye and says: "All right,
*asshole* -- you and me are going downtown!" All the hardware in the world
will not insulate your nerves from these actual real-life sensations of terror and
guilt.
Cops know ways to get from point A to point Z without thumbing
through every letter in some smart-ass bad-guy's alphabet. Cops know how to
cut to the chase. Cops know a lot of things other people don't know.
Hackers know a lot of things other people don't know, too. Hackers
know, for instance, how to sneak into your computer through the phone-lines.
But cops can show up *right on your doorstep* and carry off *you* and your
computer in separate steel boxes. A cop interested in hackers can grab them
and grill them. A hacker interested in cops has to depend on hearsay,
underground legends, and what cops are willing to publicly reveal. And the
Secret Service didn't get named "the *Secret* Service" because they blab a lot.
Some people, our lecturer informed us, were under the mistaken impression that
it was "impossible" to tap a fiber-optic line. Well, he announced, he and his son
had just whipped up a fiber-optic tap in his workshop at home. He passed it
around the audience, along with a circuit-covered LAN plug-in card so we'd all
recognize one if we saw it on a case. We all had a look.
The tap was a classic "Goofy Prototype" -- a thumb-length rounded metal
cylinder with a pair of plastic brackets on it. From one end dangled three thin
black cables, each of which ended in a tiny black plastic cap. When you
plucked the safety-cap off the end of a cable, you could see the glass fiber - no
thicker than a pinhole.
Our lecturer informed us that the metal cylinder was a "wavelength
division multiplexer." Apparently, what one did was to cut the fiber-optic cable,
insert two of the legs into the cut to complete the network again, and then read
any passing data on the line by hooking up the third leg to some kind of monitor.
Sounded simple enough. I wondered why nobody had thought of it before. I
also wondered whether this guy's son back at the workshop had any teenage
friends.
We had a break. The guy sitting next to me was wearing a giveaway
baseball cap advertising the Uzi submachine gun. We had a desultory chat about
the merits of Uzis. Long a favorite of the Secret Service, it seems Uzis went out
of fashion with the advent of the Persian Gulf War, our Arab allies taking some
offense at Americans toting Israeli weapons. Besides, I was informed by another
expert, Uzis jam. The equivalent weapon of choice today is the Heckler &
Koch, manufactured in Germany.
The guy with the Uzi cap was a forensic photographer. He also did a lot
of photographic surveillance work in computer crime cases. He used to, that is,
until the firings in Phoenix. He was now a private investigator and, with his
wife, ran a photography salon specializing in weddings and portrait photos. At -
- one must repeat -- a considerable rise in income. He was still FCIC. If you
were FCIC, and you needed to talk to an expert about forensic photography,
well, there he was, willing and able. If he hadn't shown up, people would have
missed him.
Our lecturer had raised the point that preliminary investigation of a
computer system is vital before any seizure is undertaken. It's vital to
understand how many machines are in there, what kinds there are, what kind of
operating system they use, how many people use them, where the actual data
itself is stored. To simply barge into an office demanding "all the computers" is
a recipe for swift disaster.
This entails some discreet inquiries beforehand. In fact, what it entails is
basically undercover work. An intelligence operation. *Spying,* not to put too
fine a point on it.
In a chat after the lecture, I asked an attendee whether "trashing" might
work.
I received a swift briefing on the theory and practice of "trash covers."
Police "trash covers," like "mail covers" or like wiretaps, require the agreement
of a judge. This obtained, the "trashing" work of cops is just like that of hackers,
only more so and much better organized. So much so, I was informed, that
mobsters in Phoenix make extensive use of locked garbage cans picked up by a
specialty high-security trash company.
In one case, a tiger team of Arizona cops had trashed a local residence
for four months. Every week they showed up on the municipal garbage truck,
disguised as garbagemen, and carried the contents of the suspect cans off to a
shade tree, where they combed through the garbage -- a messy task, especially
considering that one of the occupants was undergoing kidney dialysis. All useful
documents were cleaned, dried and examined. A discarded typewriter-ribbon
was an especially valuable source of data, as its long onestrike ribbon of film
contained the contents of every letter mailed out of the house. The letters were
neatly retyped by a police secretary equipped with a large desk-mounted
magnifying glass.
There is something weirdly disquieting about the whole subject of
"trashing" -- an unsuspected and indeed rather disgusting mode of deep personal
vulnerability. Things that we pass by every day, that we take utterly for granted,
can be exploited with so little work. Once discovered, the knowledge of these
vulnerabilities tend to spread.
Take the lowly subject of *manhole covers.* The humble manhole cover
reproduces many of the dilemmas of computer-security in miniature. Manhole
covers are, of course, technological artifacts, access-points to our buried urban
infrastructure. To the vast majority of us, manhole covers are invisible. They
are also vulnerable. For many years now, the Secret Service has made a point of
caulking manhole covers along all routes of the Presidential motorcade. This is,
of course, to deter terrorists from leaping out of underground ambush or, more
likely, planting remote-control carsmashing bombs beneath the street.
Lately, manhole covers have seen more and more criminal exploitation,
especially in New York City. Recently, a telco in New York City discovered
that a cable television service had been sneaking into telco manholes and
installing cable service alongside the phone-lines -- *without paying royalties.*
New York companies have also suffered a general plague of (a) underground
copper cable theft; (b) dumping of garbage, including toxic waste, and (c) hasty
dumping of murder victims.
Industry complaints reached the ears of an innovative New England
industrial-security company, and the result was a new product known as "the
Intimidator," a thick titanium-steel bolt with a precisely machined head that
requires a special device to unscrew. All these "keys" have registered serial
numbers kept on file with the manufacturer. There are now some thousands of
these "Intimidator" bolts being sunk into American pavements wherever our
President passes, like some macabre parody of strewn roses. They are also
spreading as fast as steel dandelions around US military bases and many centers
of private industry.
Quite likely it has never occurred to you to peer under a manhole cover,
perhaps climb down and walk around down there with a flashlight, just to see
what it's like. Formally speaking, this might be trespassing, but if you didn't hurt
anything, and didn't make an absolute habit of it, nobody would really care. The
freedom to sneak under manholes was likely a freedom you never intended to
exercise.
You now are rather less likely to have that freedom at all. You may
never even have missed it until you read about it here, but if you're in New York
City it's gone, and elsewhere it's likely going. This is one of the things that
crime, and the reaction to crime, does to us.
The tenor of the meeting now changed as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation arrived. The EFF, whose personnel and history will be examined in
detail in the next chapter, are a pioneering civil liberties group who arose in
direct response to the Hacker Crackdown of 1990.
Now Mitchell Kapor, the Foundation's president, and Michael Godwin,
its chief attorney, were confronting federal law enforcement *mano a mano* for
the first time ever. Ever alert to the manifold uses of publicity, Mitch Kapor and
Mike Godwin had brought their own journalist in tow: Robert Draper, from
Austin, whose recent wellreceived book about ROLLING STONE magazine was
still on the stands. Draper was on assignment for TEXAS MONTHLY.
The Steve Jackson/EFF civil lawsuit against the Chicago Computer
Fraud and Abuse Task Force was a matter of considerable regional interest in
Texas. There were now two Austinite journalists here on the case. In fact,
counting Godwin (a former Austinite and former journalist) there were three of
us. Lunch was like Old Home Week.
Later, I took Draper up to my hotel room. We had a long frank talk
about the case, networking earnestly like a miniature freelance-journo version of
the FCIC: privately confessing the numerous blunders of journalists covering
the story, and trying hard to figure out who was who and what the hell was really
going on out there. I showed Draper everything I had dug out of the Hilton
trashcan. We pondered the ethics of "trashing" for a while, and agreed that they
were dismal. We also agreed that finding a SPRINT bill on your first time out
was a heck of a coincidence.
First I'd "trashed" -- and now, mere hours later, I'd bragged to someone
else. Having entered the lifestyle of hackerdom, I was now, unsurprisingly,
following its logic. Having discovered something remarkable through a
surreptitious action, I of course *had* to "brag," and to drag the passing Draper
into my iniquities. I felt I needed a witness. Otherwise nobody would have
believed what I'd discovered....
Back at the meeting, Thackeray cordially, if rather tentatively, introduced
Kapor and Godwin to her colleagues. Papers were distributed. Kapor took
center stage. The brilliant Bostonian high-tech entrepreneur, normally the hawk
in his own administration and quite an effective public speaker, seemed visibly
nervous, and frankly admitted as much. He began by saying he consided
computer-intrusion to be morally wrong, and that the EFF was not a "hacker
defense fund," despite what had appeared in print. Kapor chatted a bit about
the basic motivations of his group, emphasizing their good faith and willingness
to listen and seek common ground with law enforcement -- when, er, possible.
Then, at Godwin's urging, Kapor suddenly remarked that EFF's own
Internet machine had been "hacked" recently, and that EFF did not consider this
incident amusing.
After this surprising confession, things began to loosen up quite rapidly.
Soon Kapor was fielding questions, parrying objections, challenging definitions,
and juggling paradigms with something akin to his usual gusto.
Kapor seemed to score quite an effect with his shrewd and skeptical
analysis of the merits of telco "Caller-ID" services. (On this topic, FCIC and
EFF have never been at loggerheads, and have no particular established
earthworks to defend.) Caller-ID has generally been promoted as a privacy
service for consumers, a presentation Kapor described as a "smokescreen," the
real point of Caller-ID being to *allow corporate customers to build extensive
commercial databases on everybody who phones or faxes them.* Clearly, few
people in the room had considered this possibility, except perhaps for two late-
arrivals from US WEST RBOC security, who chuckled nervously.
Mike Godwin then made an extensive presentation on "Civil Liberties
Implications of Computer Searches and Seizures." Now, at last, we were
getting to the real nitty-gritty here, real political horse-trading. The audience
listened with close attention, angry mutters rising occasionally: "He's trying to
teach us our jobs!" "We've been thinking about this for years! We think about
these issues every day!" "If I didn't seize the works, I'd be sued by the guy's
victims!" "I'm violating the law if I leave ten thousand disks full of illegal
*pirated software* and *stolen codes!*" "It's our job to make sure people don't
trash the Constitution -- we're the *defenders* of the Constitution!" "We seize
stuff when we know it will be forfeited anyway as restitution for the victim!"
"If it's forfeitable, then don't get a search warrant, get a forfeiture
warrant," Godwin suggested coolly. He further remarked that most suspects in
computer crime don't *want* to see their computers vanish out the door, headed
God knew where, for who knows how long. They might not mind a search, even
an extensive search, but they want their machines searched on-site. "Are they
gonna feed us?" somebody asked sourly. "How about if you take copies of the
data?" Godwin parried.
"That'll never stand up in court." "Okay, you make copies, give *them*
the copies, and take the originals."
Hmmm.
Godwin championed bulletin-board systems as repositories of First
Amendment protected free speech. He complained that federal computercrime
training manuals gave boards a bad press, suggesting that they are hotbeds of
crime haunted by pedophiles and crooks, whereas the vast majority of the
nation's thousands of boards are completely innocuous, and nowhere near so
romantically suspicious.
People who run boards violently resent it when their systems are seized,
and their dozens (or hundreds) of users look on in abject horror. Their rights of
free expression are cut short. Their right to associate with other people is
infringed. And their privacy is violated as their private electronic mail becomes
police property.
Not a soul spoke up to defend the practice of seizing boards. The issue
passed in chastened silence. Legal principles aside -- (and those principles
cannot be settled without laws passed or court precedents) -- seizing bulletin
boards has become public-relations poison for American computer police.
And anyway, it's not entirely necessary. If you're a cop, you can get 'most
everything you need from a pirate board, just by using an inside informant.
Plenty of vigilantes -- well, *concerned citizens* -will inform police the moment
they see a pirate board hit their area (and will tell the police all about it, in such
technical detail, actually, that you kinda wish they'd shut up). They will happily
supply police with extensive downloads or printouts. It's *impossible* to keep
this fluid electronic information out of the hands of police. Some people in the
electronic community become enraged at the prospect of cops "monitoring"
bulletin boards. This does have touchy aspects, as Secret Service people in
particular examine bulletin boards with some regularity. But to expect
electronic police to be deaf dumb and blind in regard to this particular medium
rather flies in the face of common sense. Police watch television, listen to radio,
read newspapers and magazines; why should the new medium of boards be
different? Cops can exercise the same access to electronic information as
everybody else. As we have seen, quite a few computer police maintain *their
own* bulletin boards, including anti-hacker "sting" boards, which have
generally proven quite effective.
As a final clincher, their Mountie friends in Canada (and colleagues in
Ireland and Taiwan) don't have First Amendment or American constitutional
restrictions, but they do have phone lines, and can call any bulletin board in
America whenever they please. The same technological determinants that play
into the hands of hackers, phone phreaks and software pirates can play into the
hands of police. "Technological determinants" don't have *any* human
allegiances. They're not black or white, or Establishment or Underground, or
pro-or-anti anything.
Godwin complained at length about what he called "the Clever Hobbyist
hypothesis" -- the assumption that the "hacker" you're busting is clearly a
technical genius, and must therefore by searched with extreme thoroughness.
So: from the law's point of view, why risk missing anything? Take the works.
Take the guy's computer. Take his books. Take his notebooks. Take the
electronic drafts of his love letters. Take his Walkman. Take his wife's
computer. Take his dad's computer. Take his kid sister's computer. Take his
employer's computer. Take his compact disks -- they *might* be CD-ROM
disks, cunningly disguised as pop music. Take his laser printer -- he might have
hidden something vital in the printer's 5meg of memory. Take his software
manuals and hardware documentation. Take his science-fiction novels and his
simulationgaming books. Take his Nintendo Game-Boy and his Pac-Man arcade
game. Take his answering machine, take his telephone out of the wall. Take
anything remotely suspicious.
Godwin pointed out that most "hackers" are not, in fact, clever genius
hobbyists. Quite a few are crooks and grifters who don't have much in the way
of technical sophistication; just some rule-of-thumb rip-off techniques. The
same goes for most fifteenyear-olds who've downloaded a code-scanning
program from a pirate board. There's no real need to seize everything in sight.
It doesn't require an entire computer system and ten thousand disks to prove a
case in court.
What if the computer is the instrumentality of a crime? someone
demanded.
Godwin admitted quietly that the doctrine of seizing the instrumentality
of a crime was pretty well established in the American legal system. The
meeting broke up. Godwin and Kapor had to leave. Kapor was testifying next
morning before the Massachusetts Department Of Public Utility, about ISDN
narrowband wide-area networking.
As soon as they were gone, Thackeray seemed elated. She had taken a
great risk with this. Her colleagues had not, in fact, torn Kapor and Godwin's
heads off. She was very proud of them, and told them so.
"Did you hear what Godwin said about *instrumentality of a crime?*"
she exulted, to nobody in particular. "Wow, that means *Mitch isn't going to sue
me."
8.
The Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center is a 1500-acre facility on Georgia's Atlantic coast.
It's a milieu of marshgrass, seabirds, damp, clinging sea-breezes, palmettos,
mosquitos, and bats. Until 1974, it was a Navy Air Base, and still features a
working runway, and some WWII vintage blockhouses and officers' quarters.
The Center has since benefitted by a forty-million-dollar retrofit, but there's still
enough forest and swamp on the facility for the Border Patrol to put in tracking
practice.
As a town, "Glynco" scarcely exists. The nearest real town is Brunswick,
a few miles down Highway 17, where I stayed at the aptly named Marshview
Holiday Inn. I had Sunday dinner at a seafood restaurant called "Jinright's,"
where I feasted on deep-fried alligator tail. This local favorite was a heaped
basket of bite-sized chunks of white, tender, almost fluffy reptile meat, steaming
in a peppered batter crust. Alligator makes a culinary experience that's hard to
forget, especially when liberally basted with homemade cocktail sauce from a
Jinright squeeze-bottle.
The crowded clientele were tourists, fishermen, local black folks in their
Sunday best, and white Georgian locals who all seemed to bear an uncanny
resemblance to Georgia humorist Lewis Grizzard. The 2,400 students from 75
federal agencies who make up the FLETC population scarcely seem to make a
dent in the low-key local scene. The students look like tourists, and the teachers
seem to have taken on much of the relaxed air of the Deep South. My host was
Mr. Carlton Fitzpatrick, the Program Coordinator of the Financial Fraud
Institute. Carlton Fitzpatrick is a mustached, sinewy, well-tanned Alabama
native somewhere near his late forties, with a fondness for chewing tobacco,
powerful computers, and salty, down-home homilies. We'd met before, at FCIC
in Arizona.
The Financial Fraud Institute is one of the nine divisions at FLETC.
Besides Financial Fraud, there's Driver & Marine, Firearms, and Physical
Training. These are specialized pursuits. There are also five general training
divisions: Basic Training, Operations, Enforcement Techniques, Legal Division,
and Behavioral Science.
Somewhere in this curriculum is everything necessary to turn green
college graduates into federal agents. First they're given ID cards. Then they get
the rather miserable-looking blue coveralls known as "smurf suits." The trainees
are assigned a barracks and a cafeteria, and immediately set on FLETC's bone-
grinding physical training routine. Besides the obligatory daily jogging -- (the
trainers run up danger flags beside the track when the humidity rises high
enough to threaten heat stroke) - there's the Nautilus machines, the martial arts,
the survival skills....
The eighteen federal agencies who maintain onsite academies at FLETC
employ a wide variety of specialized law enforcement units, some of them rather
arcane. There's Border Patrol, IRS Criminal Investigation Division, Park
Service, Fish and Wildlife, Customs, Immigration, Secret Service and the
Treasury's uniformed subdivisions.... If you're a federal cop and you don't work
for the FBI, you train at FLETC. This includes people as apparently obscure as
the agents of the Railroad Retirement Board Inspector General. Or the
Tennessee Valley Authority Police, who are in fact federal police officers, and
can and do arrest criminals on the federal property of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
And then there are the computer-crime people. All sorts, all backgrounds.
Mr. Fitzpatrick is not jealous of his specialized knowledge. Cops all over, in
every branch of service, may feel a need to learn what he can teach.
Backgrounds don't matter much. Fitzpatrick himself was originally a Border
Patrol veteran, then became a Border Patrol instructor at FLETC. His Spanish is
still fluent -- but he found himself strangely fascinated when the first computers
showed up at the Training Center. Fitzpatrick did have a background in electrical
engineering, and though he never considered himself a computer hacker, he
somehow found himself writing useful little programs for this new and
promising gizmo.
He began looking into the general subject of computers and crime,
reading Donn Parker's books and articles, keeping an ear cocked for war stories,
useful insights from the field, the up-and-coming people of the local computer-
crime and hightechnology units.... Soon he got a reputation around FLETC as
the resident "computer expert," and that reputation alone brought him more
exposure, more experience -- until one day he looked around, and sure enough
he *was* a federal computer-crime expert.
In fact, this unassuming, genial man may be *the* federal computer-
crime expert. There are plenty of very good computer people, and plenty of
very good federal investigators, but the area where these worlds of expertise
overlap is very slim. And Carlton Fitzpatrick has been right at the center of that
since 1985, the first year of the Colluquy, a group which owes much to his
influence.
He seems quite at home in his modest, acoustic-tiled office, with its
Ansel Adams-style Western photographic art, a gold-framed Senior Instructor
Certificate, and a towering bookcase crammed with three-ring binders with
ominous titles such as *Datapro Reports on Information Security* and *CFCA
Telecom Security '90.*
The phone rings every ten minutes; colleagues show up at the door to
chat about new developments in locksmithing or to shake their heads over the
latest dismal developments in the BCCI global banking scandal.
Carlton Fitzpatrick is a fount of computer-crime war-stories, related in an
acerbic drawl. He tells me the colorful tale of a hacker caught in California
some years back. He'd been raiding systems, typing code without a detectable
break, for twenty, twenty-four, thirty-six hours straight. Not just logged on --
*typing.* Investigators were baffled. Nobody could do that. Didn't he have to
go to the bathroom? Was it some kind of automatic keyboard-whacking device
that could actually type code?
A raid on the suspect's home revealed a situation of astonishing squalor.
The hacker turned out to be a Pakistani computer-science student who had
flunked out of a California university. He'd gone completely underground as an
illegal electronic immigrant, and was selling stolen phoneservice to stay alive.
The place was not merely messy and dirty, but in a state of psychotic disorder.
Powered by some weird mix of culture shock, computer addiction, and
amphetamines, the suspect had in fact been sitting in front of his computer for a
day and a half straight, with snacks and drugs at hand on the edge of his desk
and a chamber-pot under his chair.
Word about stuff like this gets around in the hacker-tracker community.
Carlton Fitzpatrick takes me for a guided tour by car around the FLETC
grounds. One of our first sights is the biggest indoor firing range in the world.
There are federal trainees in there, Fitzpatrick assures me politely, blasting away
with a wide variety of automatic weapons: Uzis, Glocks, AK-47s.... He's
willing to take me inside. I tell him I'm sure that's really interesting, but I'd
rather see his computers. Carlton Fitzpatrick seems quite surprised and pleased.
I'm apparently the first journalist he's ever seen who has turned down the
shooting gallery in favor of microchips.
Our next stop is a favorite with touring Congressmen: the three-mile
long FLETC driving range. Here trainees of the Driver & Marine Division are
taught high-speed pursuit skills, setting and breaking road-blocks, diplomatic
security driving for VIP limousines.... A favorite FLETC pastime is to strap a
passing Senator into the passenger seat beside a Driver & Marine trainer, hit a
hundred miles an hour, then take it right into "the skid-pan," a section of greased
track where two tons of Detroit iron can whip and spin like a hockey puck.
Cars don't fare well at FLETC. First they're rifled again and again for
search practice. Then they do 25,000 miles of high-speed pursuit training; they
get about seventy miles per set of steel-belted radials. Then it's off to the skid
pan, where sometimes they roll and tumble headlong in the grease. When
they're sufficiently grease-stained, dented, and creaky, they're sent to the
roadblock unit, where they're battered without pity. And finally then they're
sacrificed to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, whose trainees learn
the ins and outs of car-bomb work by blowing them into smoking wreckage.
There's a railroad box-car on the FLETC grounds, and a large grounded
boat, and a propless plane; all training-grounds for searches. The plane sits
forlornly on a patch of weedy tarmac next to an eerie blockhouse known as the
"ninja compound," where anti-terrorism specialists practice hostage rescues. As
I gaze on this creepy paragon of modern low-intensity warfare, my nerves are
jangled by a sudden staccato outburst of automatic weapons fire, somewhere in
the woods to my right. "Ninemillimeter," Fitzpatrick judges calmly.
Even the eldritch ninja compound pales somewhat compared to the truly
surreal area known as "the raid-houses." This is a street lined on both sides
with nondescript concrete-block houses with flat pebbled roofs. They were once
officers' quarters. Now they are training grounds. The first one to our left,
Fitzpatrick tells me, has been specially adapted for computer search-and-seizure
practice. Inside it has been wired for video from top to bottom, with eighteen
pan-and-tilt remotely controlled videocams mounted on walls and in corners.
Every movement of the trainee agent is recorded live by teachers, for later taped
analysis. Wasted movements, hesitations, possibly lethal tactical mistakes -- all
are gone over in detail.
Perhaps the weirdest single aspect of this building is its front door,
scarred and scuffed all along the bottom, from the repeated impact, day after day,
of federal shoe-leather.
Down at the far end of the row of raid-houses some people are practicing
a murder. We drive by slowly as some very young and rather nervouslooking
federal trainees interview a heavyset bald man on the raid-house lawn. Dealing
with murder takes a lot of practice; first you have to learn to control your own
instinctive disgust and panic, then you have to learn to control the reactions of a
nerveshredded crowd of civilians, some of whom may have just lost a loved one,
some of whom may be murderers -- quite possibly both at once.
A dummy plays the corpse. The roles of the bereaved, the morbidly
curious, and the homicidal are played, for pay, by local Georgians: waitresses,
musicians, most anybody who needs to moonlight and can learn a script. These
people, some of whom are FLETC regulars year after year, must surely have one
of the strangest jobs in the world.
Something about the scene: "normal" people in a weird situation,
standing around talking in bright Georgia sunshine, unsuccessfully pretending
that something dreadful has gone on, while a dummy lies inside on faked
bloodstains.... While behind this weird masquerade, like a nested set of Russian
dolls, are grim future realities of real death, real violence, real murders of real
people, that these young agents will really investigate, many times during their
careers.... Over and over.... Will those anticipated murders look like this, feel
like this -- not as "real" as these amateur actors are trying to make it seem, but
both as "real," and as numbingly unreal, as watching fake people standing
around on a fake lawn? Something about this scene unhinges me. It seems
nightmarish to me, Kafkaesque. I simply don't know how to take it; my head is
turned around; I don't know whether to laugh, cry, or just shudder.
When the tour is over, Carlton Fitzpatrick and I talk about computers.
For the first time cyberspace seems like quite a comfortable place. It seems very
real to me suddenly, a place where I know what I'm talking about, a place I'm
used to. It's real. "Real." Whatever.
Carlton Fitzpatrick is the only person I've met in cyberspace circles who
is happy with his present equipment. He's got a 5 Meg RAM PC with a 112 meg
hard disk; a 660 meg's on the way. He's got a Compaq 386 desktop, and a
Zenith 386 laptop with 120 meg. Down the hall is a NEC Multi-Sync 2A with a
CD-ROM drive and a 9600 baud modem with four com-lines. There's a training
minicomputer, and a 10-meg local mini just for the Center, and a lab-full of
student PC clones and half-a-dozen Macs or so. There's a Data General MV
2500 with 8 meg on board and a 370 meg disk.
Fitzpatrick plans to run a UNIX board on the Data General when he's
finished beta-testing the software for it, which he wrote himself. It'll have E-
mail features, massive files on all manner of computer-crime and investigation
procedures, and will follow the computer-security specifics of the Department of
Defense "Orange Book." He thinks it will be the biggest BBS in the federal
government. Will it have *Phrack* on it? I ask wryly.
Sure, he tells me. *Phrack,* *TAP,* *Computer Underground Digest,*
all that stuff. With proper disclaimers, of course.
I ask him if he plans to be the sysop. Running a system that size is very
time-consuming, and Fitzpatrick teaches two three-hour courses every day.
No, he says seriously, FLETC has to get its money worth out of the
instructors. He thinks he can get a local volunteer to do it, a high-school student.
He says a bit more, something I think about an Eagle Scout law-enforcement
liaison program, but my mind has rocketed off in disbelief.
"You're going to put a *teenager* in charge of a federal security BBS?"
I'm speechless. It hasn't escaped my notice that the FLETC Financial Fraud
Institute is the *ultimate* hacker-trashing target; there is stuff in here, stuff of
such utter and consummate cool by every standard of the digital underground.... I
imagine the hackers of my acquaintance, fainting dead-away from forbidden-
knowledge greed-fits, at the mere prospect of cracking the superultra top-secret
computers used to train the Secret Service in computer-crime....
"Uhm, Carlton," I babble, "I'm sure he's a really nice kid and all, but
that's a terrible temptation to set in front of somebody who's, you know, into
computers and just starting out..."
"Yeah," he says, "that did occur to me." For the first time I begin to
suspect that he's pulling my leg.
He seems proudest when he shows me an ongoing project called JICC,
Joint Intelligence Control Council. It's based on the services provided by EPIC,
the El Paso Intelligence Center, which supplies data and intelligence to the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the
state police of the four southern border states. Certain EPIC files can now be
accessed by drug-enforcement police of Central America, South America and the
Caribbean, who can also trade information among themselves. Using a telecom
program called "White Hat," written by two brothers named Lopez from the
Dominican Republic, police can now network internationally on inexpensive
PCs. Carlton Fitzpatrick is teaching a class of drug-war agents from the Third
World, and he's very proud of their progress. Perhaps soon the sophisticated
smuggling networks of the Medellin Cartel will be matched by a sophisticated
computer network of the Medellin Cartel's sworn enemies. They'll track boats,
track contraband, track the international drug-lords who now leap over borders
with great ease, defeating the police through the clever use of fragmented
national jurisdictions.
JICC and EPIC must remain beyond the scope of this book. They seem
to me to be very large topics fraught with complications that I am not fit to
judge. I do know, however, that the international, computer-assisted
networking of police, across national boundaries, is something that Carlton
Fitzpatrick considers very important, a harbinger of a desirable future. I also
know that networks by their nature ignore physical boundaries. And I also know
that where you put communications you put a community, and that when those
communities become self-aware they will fight to preserve themselves and to
expand their influence. I make no judgements whether this is good or bad. It's
just cyberspace; it's just the way things are.
I asked Carlton Fitzpatrick what advice he would have for a twenty-year-
old who wanted to shine someday in the world of electronic law enforcement.
He told me that the number one rule was simply not to be scared of
computers. You don't need to be an obsessive "computer weenie," but you
mustn't be buffaloed just because some machine looks fancy. The advantages
computers give smart crooks are matched by the advantages they give smart
cops. Cops in the future will have to enforce the law "with their heads, not their
holsters." Today you can make good cases without ever leaving your office. In
the future, cops who resist the computer revolution will never get far beyond
walking a beat.
I asked Carlton Fitzpatrick if he had some single message for the public;
some single thing that he would most like the American public to know about
his work.
He thought about it while. "Yes," he said finally. "*Tell* me the rules,
and I'll *teach* those rules!" He looked me straight in the eye. "I do the best
that I can."
Brought to you
by
The Cyberpunk Project